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INTRODUCTION
In his dissenting opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 Justice Thomas cited
Justice Jackson approvingly for the following proposition:
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the
political departments of the government . . . . They are decisions of a kind . . .
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
2
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.

Under this view, which I will call the “exclusive political control” thesis, the
judiciary is barred from participating in foreign affairs decision making
because the Constitution grants the political branches exclusive control over
foreign policy. Several scholars have defended variants of the exclusive
political control thesis.3 This Article demonstrates that the exclusive political
control thesis is incompatible with the original understanding of the Founders.
The Article does not defend originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation;4 it merely shows that the exclusive political control thesis is
inconsistent with an originalist approach.
The Article examines the implementation of U.S. neutrality policy in the
period from 1793 to 1797. Other scholars have analyzed the initial formulation
of U.S. neutrality policy in 1793.5 Scholars who focus narrowly on the year
1793, when the United States first articulated its neutrality policy, have
concluded that “the federal courts played a relatively minor role in resolving
the nation’s foreign affairs problems.”6 However, if one expands the time
frame of the analysis to include the years 1794 to 1797, when the United States
confronted a series of issues related to implementation of its neutrality policy,
a different constitutional picture emerges. This Article shows that the federal
1. 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 582–83 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948)).
3. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 8 (2005) (claiming that the “founding generation” believed that
“the bulk of the foreign affairs power was vested in the executive” and that “[c]ourts did not play
a significant role”); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 944
(2004) (“[C]ompared to the political branches, the courts suffer from peculiar institutional
disadvantages that often warrant absolute deference to the decision of the political branches in
most foreign affairs controversies.”).
4. For an insightful analysis of the application of originalist methodology to constitutional
foreign affairs issues, see Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 5 (2008).
5. See, e.g., HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION (1973); WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL (2006); CHARLES MARION
THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT (AMS Press,
Inc. 1967) (1931).
6. CASTO, supra note 5, at 3.
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judiciary played a very significant role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy
during this period.
Between February 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided
twenty-four cases arising from French privateering activities, including
fourteen published decisions7 and ten unpublished decisions.8 These cases
accounted for roughly half of the Supreme Court caseload during this period.9
All of the cases raised issues that were directly related to the most important
national security issue of the era: how best to maintain U.S. neutrality in the
7. The fourteen published decisions are: Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 336 (1797); Del Col v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796); Hills v. Ross, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
331 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship
Alfred, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796); Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); Cotton v.
Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796); United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796);
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
285 (1796) (this case was consolidated with Geyer v. Michel on appeal); MacDonogh v. Dannery,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188 (1796); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); United States v. Peters,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795); and Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
Technically, United States v. Peters and MacDonogh v. Dannery are not “privateer” cases
because they involved French naval vessels, not privateers. Even so, they are included for the
sake of completeness.
8. The ten unpublished decisions are: Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed
on Appellate Case Files of the Supreme Court of the United States 1792–1831 [hereinafter
Appellate Case Files] (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid
(No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications);
Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The
Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The
Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives
Microfilm Publications); and Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications).
During this period, one other French privateering case was also entered onto the
Supreme Court docket: Morphy v. Ship Sacra Familia. However, there was no Supreme Court
decision because the French and Spanish consuls agreed to discontinue the case. See 7 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 50
(Maeva Marcus ed., 2003) [hereinafter 7 DHSC].
9. During the 1790s, the Supreme Court convened for two terms each year, in February and
August. Over the course of seven terms from February 1794 to February 1797, the Court decided
approximately forty-five cases; this figure depends upon what, precisely, is counted. For present
purposes, the main point is that the French privateering cases occupied a very substantial portion
of the Supreme Court docket during this period. For detailed information about the Supreme
Court docket, see 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800, at 157–474, 483–535 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) [hereinafter 1 DHSC]
(reproducing the Supreme Court Minutes and Docket for the period 1790–1800).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

148

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:145

ongoing war that pitted France against England, Spain, and other European
powers. French diplomats repeatedly lobbied the Executive Branch to remove
the privateering cases from the courts and resolve them through diplomatic
means. From France’s perspective, the cases raised questions about sovereign
prerogatives and the conduct of naval warfare, which were properly resolved
through diplomatic negotiation, not private adjudication. Initially, U.S. judges
and executive officials were uncertain whether the cases should be resolved
diplomatically, or by means of private adjudication in U.S. courts. However, a
consensus soon emerged among cabinet officers and Supreme Court Justices
that the federal judiciary should decide the issues raised by the French
privateering cases in the context of adjudication between the French captors
and the original ship owners. Subsequently, despite repeated French
diplomatic protests, the Executive Branch steadfastly refused to intervene in
ongoing judicial proceedings.10
Four features of the French privateering cases, viewed together,
demonstrate conclusively that the exclusive political control thesis is contrary
to the original understanding of the Founders. First, the French privateering
cases were directly related to the implementation of U.S. neutrality policy,
which was the most important national security issue of the era. Second, these
cases accounted for a very substantial percentage of the Supreme Court docket
in the initial decade after the adoption of the Constitution. Third, executive
and judicial officers reached a consensus that the cases should be resolved
judicially, not diplomatically. Fourth, the cabinet officers and Supreme Court
Justices who formed that consensus included many of the leading figures
involved in drafting and ratifying the Constitution.11 Given their agreement
10. Traditional accounts of the neutrality crisis have emphasized the Supreme Court’s
refusal to issue an advisory opinion to the Executive Branch. See CASTO, supra note 5, at 107–
15; THOMAS, supra note 5, at 146–50. In the summer of 1793, the Executive Branch submitted a
set of questions to the Supreme Court related to French privateering. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 747–51 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1998) [hereinafter 6 DHSC]. The Court refused to provide an answer, stating that
“[t]he Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of
Government . . . afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the
questions alluded to.” Id. at 755. Notwithstanding this incident, though, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts decided dozens of French privateering cases in the period from 1794 to
1797, and the Executive Branch consistently refused to intervene in judicial decision making. See
infra Part III.
11. Three men served as Secretary of State during this period: Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1790
to Dec. 1793), Edmund Randolph (Jan. 1794 to Aug. 1795), and Timothy Pickering (Dec. 1795 to
May 1800). BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–
1989, at 199, 290, 300 (Robert Sobel ed., 1990). Jefferson’s credentials as one of the key
constitutional Founders are well known. Randolph played a key role at both the Constitutional
Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801, in 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 204–17,
232–36, 375–93 (1971). Pickering was not a representative to the Constitutional Convention, but
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that the federal judiciary should play a leading role in implementing U.S.
neutrality policy, claims by contemporary jurists and scholars that the
Founders granted the political branches exclusive responsibility for foreign
policy decision making are simply untenable.
It bears emphasis that all of the French privateering cases involved
disputes about the property rights of private parties, and that international law
provided many of the key substantive rules for resolving those disputes. Thus,
the government’s choice to handle these cases through litigation in federal
courts illustrates two points. First, the Founders were very comfortable with
the idea that federal courts would invoke international law to provide rules of
decision in litigation.12 Second, the Founders recognized that international
law, or the “law of nations” as it was known at that time, did not merely
regulate relations between nations: it also conferred rights on private parties.13
Leading originalist accounts of the constitutional separation of powers in
foreign affairs have tended to overlook, or give little weight to, the French
privateering cases.14 This is understandable because the cases themselves say
very little about the constitutional distribution of power in foreign affairs. Ten
of the twenty-four cases did not yield published decisions; in most of those
he did participate in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–1989, supra, at 290.
Two men served as Attorney General during this period: Edmund Randolph (Feb. 1790
to Jan. 1794) and William Bradford (Jan. 1794 to Aug. 1795). Id. at 38, 300. Before becoming
Attorney General, Bradford was a Justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (1791–1794) and
Attorney General of Pennsylvania (1780–1791). Id. at 38.
Alexander Hamilton served as Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 1789 to Feb. 1795). Id.
at 159–60. Although he had no formal responsibility for U.S. foreign policy, he was a key
presidential advisor on a wide range of issues. Hamilton’s credentials as one of the key
constitutional Founders are well known.
Three men served as Chief Justice during this period: John Jay (Sept. 1789 to June
1795), John Rutledge (Aug. 1795 to Dec. 1795), and Oliver Ellsworth (Mar. 1796 to Dec. 1800).
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., AMERICAN LEADERS 1789–1991: A BIOGRAPHICAL
SUMMARY 68–70 (1991). John Jay, as is well known, was one of three co-authors of The
Federalist Papers. He played a central role during the New York ratifying convention. See
Goebel, supra, at 393–412. Rutledge and Ellsworth both served on the Committee of Detail
during the Constitutional Convention. See id. at 232–36. They also played central roles in their
state ratifying conventions. See id. at 337–39 (Ellsworth and Connecticut), 371–75 (Rutledge and
South Carolina).
12. In contrast to some modern litigation, the courts were not utilizing international law as a
guide to constitutional interpretation. They were applying international law directly as a rule of
decision.
13. See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789–1914 (2004).
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(2007) (providing a very comprehensive account of the constitutional law of foreign affairs, as it
was understood by the founding generation, but devoting very little attention to the French
privateering cases).
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cases, the Court did not produce any written rationale. In many of the fourteen
published decisions, the Court’s written rationale says nothing about the
separation of powers issues that are the central focus of this Article. To shed
light on these issues, the author analyzed a wide variety of ancillary materials
related to the French privateering cases, including the Supreme Court papers in
the National Archives,15 other sources that present arguments advanced by the
parties in the privateering cases,16 the decisions of lower courts,17 executive
branch documents,18 and diplomatic correspondence with France and
England.19
The analysis of these ancillary materials suggests that the Founders did not
envision the lines separating the three branches of the federal government as

15. The author spent two days in the National Archives conducting research for this paper.
He reviewed the Supreme Court case files for ten of the twenty-four cases referenced above,
including two published cases, and eight unpublished cases. The two published cases are:
Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796), and Moodie v. The Ship Alfred, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796). The eight unpublished cases are: Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No.
17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v.
The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives
Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case
Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The
Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); and Moodie v.
The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives
Microfilm Publications).
16. Many of the previously unpublished documents associated with the French privateering
cases are collected in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, and 7 DHSC, supra note 8. These materials,
together with the materials in the National Archives, are invaluable for understanding the
arguments advanced by the parties in these cases.
17. Judge Thomas Bee, the federal district judge in South Carolina, decided fourteen of the
twenty-four cases referenced above, as well as some other French privateering cases that never
reached the Supreme Court. Judge Bee’s decisions in admiralty cases were published in 1810 in
a separate volume entitled REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA BY THE HON. THOMAS BEE (Phila., William P. Farrand & Co. 1810) [hereinafter
BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS]. Many of these cases were also published later in the “Federal
Cases” collection.
18. Numerous executive branch documents related to the privateering cases are reproduced
in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, and 7 DHSC, supra note 8, and in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales &
Seaton 1833) [hereinafter 1 ASPFR], available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/
lwsplink.html, and 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS (Walter Lowrie &
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832), available at http://memory.
loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html.
19. Much of the extensive diplomatic correspondence related to the French privateering
cases is preserved in volumes 1 and 2 of ASPFR, supra note 18.
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impenetrable, immovable walls. To the contrary, the key government decision
makers in the 1790s believed that they were engaged in a cooperative effort in
which all three branches of the federal government worked together to promote
U.S. foreign policy objectives. Responsibility for foreign policy decision
making was not divided into neat, separate boxes labeled “legislative,”
“executive,” and “judicial.” The foreign policy challenges facing the young
nation were too important to allow artificial “walls” separating the branches of
government to impede the active cooperation of all three branches in working
together to solve vital national security problems.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides
background on French privateering in the 1790s. Parts II and III proceed
chronologically. Part II examines the period from February 1793, when France
declared war on Great Britain and Holland, until June 1794, when Congress
enacted legislation to address the problems posed by French privateering
activities in the United States.20 During this period, the U.S. government
worked out the basic division of responsibility between the Executive and
Judicial Branches and decided that the judiciary should handle many of the
issues arising from French privateering activities. Part III analyzes the period
from June 1794 until February 1797, when the Supreme Court decided
Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance,21 the last of the French privateering cases.
During this period, British consuls utilized the U.S. judicial system to harass
French privateers and gain a tactical advantage in the ongoing naval war
between France and Great Britain. By instigating litigation in U.S. courts, the
British consuls imposed substantial economic costs on French privateers.
Those costs, combined with other factors, ultimately induced the privateers to
take their captured prizes elsewhere, rather than bringing the prizes to U.S.
ports, where they would be subjected to protracted litigation. The Article
concludes with some observations about the contemporary relevance of the
French privateering cases.
I. BACKGROUND: FRENCH PRIVATEERING IN THE 1790S
In the late eighteenth century, “privateering” was a common means of
warfare.22 If a nation with a relatively weak naval force became embroiled in
warfare, it could augment its naval power by commissioning privateers to fight
on its behalf. The term “privateer” refers both to privately owned ships that
fought on behalf of a government and to people who operated those ships. If a
man wanted to fight as a privateer on behalf of a government, he would have to

20. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
21. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797).
22. The discussion of privateering in this paragraph is drawn primarily from William R.
Casto, Foreign Affairs Crises and the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Limitation: Notes from
the Founding Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 241–43 (2004).
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bear the expense of purchasing an appropriate ship, fitting it for warfare, and
hiring a crew. He would also have to obtain a commission, sometimes called a
“letter of marque,” from a duly authorized government officer.23 Armed with
such a commission, the privateer was authorized to capture enemy merchant
vessels. The privateer would bring captured vessels to a “prize court,” a
judicial body authorized to declare whether the captured vessel was a lawful
prize. If it was a lawful prize, the captors could sell the ship and its cargo and
keep the money for themselves. Thus, the privateering system utilized the
profit motive as a force multiplier to enhance the naval power of a nation at
war.
As of March 1793, France was at war not only with England, but also with
Austria, Prussia, Spain, and the Netherlands.24 France’s naval power was no
match for the combined naval forces of its enemies. Accordingly, France
decided to make extensive use of privateers to supplement its naval forces.
The chief mission of the privateers, from France’s perspective, was to disrupt
the trade of its enemies. To perform this mission effectively, the privateers had
to operate near the ports that were used to conduct the enemies’ trade. Hence,
France deployed some privateers in the European theater and others in the
Western hemisphere.
Deployment of privateers in the Western hemisphere posed tactical
problems for France. It made no sense for privateers operating in the Western
hemisphere to carry their prizes back to France to be condemned by prize
courts in France. The trans-Atlantic journey was time-consuming and
hazardous: too many prizes would be lost en route. France established some
prize courts in French colonies in the Caribbean,25 but the British effectively
blockaded key French ports in the Caribbean for at least some of the period
under study, making it difficult for privateers to take their prizes to Caribbean
ports.26 Accordingly, France instructed many of its privateers in the Western
hemisphere to take their prizes to U.S. ports.27
France’s attempt to utilize U.S. ports as a base of operations for French
privateers posed a significant policy dilemma for the United States. On the
23. With respect to letters of marque, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV.
61, 84 (2007).
24. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at
140 (noting that “a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the
United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other”); see also Edict of His Majesty,
King of Spain (Mar. 23, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 425–26 (noting that
France declared war against Spain on March 16).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795) (describing situation where
a French naval vessel captured a merchant ship and took it to a French port in the Caribbean,
where it was condemned as a prize by a French prize court).
26. See MELVIN H. JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN CHARLESTON, 1793–1796, at 19–20 (1969).
27. See id. at 6–8.
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one hand, the United States was eager to honor its treaty commitments to
France. On the other hand, President Washington declared in April 1793 that
the United States would remain neutral in the war between France and its
various enemies.28 The dilemma arose because the 1778 Treaty with France
seemingly obligated the United States to adopt a pro-French tilt in the war.
Specifically, Article 17 granted French privateers broad rights of access to U.S.
ports,29 whereas Article 22 imposed severe restrictions on access to U.S. ports
by “foreign privateers . . . who have commissions from any other Prince or
State in enmity with” France.30
As Thomas Jefferson stated, “It is an essential character of neutrality, to
furnish no aids (not stipulated by treaty) to one party, which we are not equally
ready to furnish to the other.”31 Thus, to implement its neutrality policy and
honor its treaty commitments to France, the United States had to decide what
the treaties with France required. If the U.S. adopted an expansive view of its
treaty obligations to France, the British (and others) would object that the
United States was violating its duties as a neutral state; this course potentially
risked war with Great Britain. If the United States adopted a narrow view of
the scope of its treaty obligations, France would object that the United States
was breaching its treaty commitments; this course potentially risked war with
France. Hence, the United States attempted to steer a middle course between
the Scylla of war with England and the Charybdis of war with France. Federal
courts played a critical role in attempting to chart this middle course, in part
because key officers in the Executive and Judicial Branches agreed that the
judiciary should assume primary responsibility for making some of the crucial
decisions.
II. U.S. NEUTRALITY POLICY: FROM FEBRUARY 1793 TO JUNE 1794
Part II analyzes developments from February 1793, when France declared
war against Great Britain and Holland, until June 1794, when Congress
enacted legislation to address French privateering activities. There were two
main sets of foreign policy issues related to the conduct of French privateers
during this period. The first set of foreign policy issues related to the
substantive rules governing the conduct of French privateers. The political
branches generally took the lead in framing substantive rules, and the Judicial
Branch played a secondary role.

28. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at
140.
29. See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., art. XVII, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 22
[hereinafter 1778 Treaty with France].
30. Id. art. XXII.
31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 239.
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The second set of foreign policy issues related to jurisdictional questions:
when French privateers captured privately owned vessels, and the owners
sought restitution of the captured property on the grounds that their property
had been seized illegally, the question arose as to which branch of government
should resolve these disputes. Initially, there was some uncertainty as to
whether the Executive or the Judicial Branch should handle these questions.
France urged resolution of these disputes through diplomatic means because
France viewed the privateering cases as contests between nations about
sovereign rights.
However, a consensus soon emerged among U.S.
government officials that the Judicial Branch should decide these issues,
because the privateering cases also involved private disputes about individual
property rights. Ultimately, cabinet officials and Supreme Court Justices
agreed that the judiciary had the primary constitutional responsibility for
deciding individual disputes over ownership of property, even though the law
of nations provided most of the governing legal rules and the disputes were
intimately linked to the wartime strategy of sovereign powers.
Part II is divided into three sections. The first section addresses the
historical context. The second section analyzes the substantive rules governing
the conduct of French privateers. The third section analyzes the interplay
between the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches in framing the
jurisdictional rules that ultimately gave the judiciary primary responsibility for
resolving disputes arising from French privateering activities.
A.

Historical Context

In January 1793, French revolutionaries executed Louis XVI. Shortly
thereafter, on February 1, in the midst of revolutionary fervor at home, France
declared war on Great Britain and Holland.32 At that point, France was already
at war with Austria and Prussia. In March 1793, France also declared war on
Spain.33
Although France declared war against Great Britain on February 1, 1793,
news of the war did not reach the United States until late March or early April.
President Washington was in Mount Vernon at the time, but he traveled to
Philadelphia as quickly as possible to convene a meeting of his Cabinet.34 The
cabinet officers at the time included Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State,
Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Knox as Secretary of
War, and Edmund Randolph as Attorney General.35 The President circulated a
list of questions to the cabinet officers on April 18, and the group convened the

32. THOMAS, supra note 5, at 24.
33. See Edict of His Majesty, King of Spain (Mar. 23, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 425–26.
34. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 24–26.
35. See id. at 26–28, 66.
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next day to formulate U.S. policy.36 On April 22, the President publicly issued
a formal proclamation of neutrality, declaring the U.S. policy to “pursue a
conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers.”37
On April 8, 1793, Edmond Genet arrived in Charleston, South Carolina to
assume his position as the new French Ambassador to the United States.38
Beginning immediately after his arrival, Genet undertook a series of actions
that posed substantial challenges for U.S. foreign policy. First, Genet began
commissioning U.S. citizens to act as privateers in the service of the French
government.39 Second, Genet provided financial assistance to U.S. and French
citizens who accepted commissions to serve as privateers for France.40 With
Genet’s financial aid, the privateers purchased ships and utilized U.S. ports to
arm their ships for naval warfare.41 Additionally, Genet instructed French
consuls in major U.S. ports to establish prize courts. Consequently, French
privateers commissioned by Genet and outfitted in the United States began
bringing their prizes into U.S. ports so that French consuls operating prize
courts on U.S. territory could adjudicate the lawfulness of their prizes.42
In part due to the policies he pursued, and in part due to his confrontational
style, Genet quickly made many enemies in the U.S. government. Hence, in
August 1793, the United States decided to request the recall of Ambassador
Genet.43 The French government granted that request in October 1793, and
Genet’s replacement, Joseph Fauchet, arrived in the United States in February
1794.44
In the fourteen months after President Washington issued his neutrality
proclamation, there were three key milestones in the development of the U.S.
response to French privateering activities. First, on August 4, 1793, the
Treasury Secretary (Alexander Hamilton) promulgated regulations for the
guidance of U.S. customs collectors.45 Second, on February 18, 1794, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey.46 Third, on
36. See id. at 26–41.
37. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at
140.
38. AMMON, supra note 5, at vii.
39. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 698 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Casto, supra note 22, at 243.
43. See The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet, in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 39, at 685–715.
44. See AMMON, supra note 5, at 155–59.
45. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 140–41.
46. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). The precise date is recorded in The Minutes of the Supreme
Court of the United States (Feb. 18, 1794), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 229.
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June 5, 1794, Congress enacted legislation that was designed to regulate the
activities of French privateers in U.S. ports.47 The Treasury regulations and
the subsequent legislation defined the key substantive rules governing the
conduct of French privateers. In contrast, the Supreme Court decision in Sloop
Betsey addressed important jurisdictional questions, and resolved key
constitutional separation of powers issues that had been percolating in the
Executive Branch and in the lower federal courts for the previous year.
B.

Substantive Rules Governing Privateers

This section discusses the main substantive issues related to French
privateering: (1) whether French privateers could sell their prizes in U.S. ports;
(2) whether France could recruit U.S. citizens to serve as privateers on behalf
of France; and (3) whether French privateers could utilize U.S. ports to outfit
civilian vessels for naval warfare or to augment the military capabilities of
vessels that were already equipped for naval warfare.
1.

Sale of Prizes

In traditional European wars, a privateer who captured a prize would bring
it to a prize court in his home country to obtain a judgment confirming that it
was a lawful prize.48 Then, when he sold the prize and its cargo, he could
invoke the judgment of the prize court to prove that he had a legally valid title
to the property he was selling.49 France attempted to export this model to the
Western hemisphere by establishing French prize courts on U.S. territory.50
The key strategic goal was to provide financial incentives for prospective
privateers to operate in the American theater by establishing a juridical system
that would ensure their ability to sell captured property for financial gain.
Without the economic inducement of a solid return on investment, France
would be unable to enlist sufficient numbers of privateers, and its military
strategy would fail.
Accordingly, Genet instructed French consuls in the United States to
establish prize courts on U.S. territory.51 Genet believed that France had a
right to do so under Article 12 of the 1788 Consular Treaty between the United
States and France.52 However, the Washington Administration did not agree
47. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
48. See Casto, supra note 22, at 242–43.
49. See id. at 242.
50. Id. at 243.
51. THOMAS, supra note 5, at 206–07.
52. Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice
Consuls, U.S.-Fr., art. XII, Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106. Article 12 authorized French consuls, for
example, to adjudicate disputes between a French captain and his crew while they were docked at
U.S. ports. See id. It was quite a stretch, though, for Genet to suggest that Article 12 authorized
France to establish prize courts on U.S. territory.
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that the Treaty granted France any such right. Moreover, the Executive Branch
viewed Genet’s effort to establish French prize courts on U.S. territory as a
flagrant violation of U.S. sovereignty and neutrality.53 Consequently, Jefferson
wrote directly to the French consuls and vice consuls in the United States
(bypassing Genet), warning them that they would be subject to prosecution and
punishment if they, “within the United States, . . . assume to try the validity of
prizes, and to give sentence thereon, as judges of admiralty.”54
Importantly, although the Executive Branch determined that any judgment
issued by a French prize court operating on U.S. territory was “a mere
nullity,”55 the government did not attempt to block the sale of prizes in U.S.
ports by French privateers.56 The decision not to interfere with the sale of
captured prizes and their cargo was significant because it preserved a financial
incentive for French privateers to bring their captured prizes to U.S. ports. If a
privateer sold his prize without first obtaining a valid judgment from a prize
court, the ship itself would sell at a discounted price because the buyer had to
assume the risk that the original owner might file a legal action to claim title to
the vessel.57 However, privateers could sell captured cargo at full value
because the buyers did not face a significant risk of subsequent legal action by
the original owners. Overall, the financial incentives were sufficient to induce
French privateers to bring captured prizes to U.S. ports and sell them for
financial gain.58

53. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 38–39.
54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to French Consuls (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 175.
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 38.
56. See Message from George Washington to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), as reprinted in 1
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 140 (“I have not thought myself at liberty to forbid the sale of the
prizes, permitted by our treaty of commerce with France to be brought into our ports . . . .”); see
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 705–06 (explaining and defending U.S. position on
sale of prizes in U.S. ports).
57. Assume, for example, that a French privateer captured a British merchant vessel and sold
the British vessel to an American merchant who wanted to use the vessel to conduct transAtlantic trade. If the French privateer obtained a valid judgment from a prize court before selling
the captured ship to the American buyer, then the buyer would obtain a secure title protected by
that judgment. But if the American buyer purchased a ship that had not been condemned by a
prize court as a valid prize, and the buyer then sailed the ship to a French port, the original British
owner could initiate a legal action in a French prize court to challenge the legality of the initial
capture. If the British owner prevailed, the American buyer would lose possession of the vessel
and would have little recourse against the French privateer who sold him the vessel.
58. See JACKSON, supra note 26, at 127–53 (providing detailed information about the sale of
British, Spanish, and Dutch prizes captured by French privateers and brought to the ports of
Charleston, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia between April 1793 and April 1796).
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In sum, the Washington Administration “split the baby” by prohibiting the
establishment of French prize courts on U.S. territory, but permitting the sale
of French prizes. This Solomonic solution was generally consistent with
France’s strategic interests. As long as French privateers could sell captured
prizes and cargo in U.S. ports, there would be strong economic inducements
for privateering, and France would be able to recruit a sufficient number of
privateers to achieve its military objectives.
2.

Recruiting U.S. Citizens

As noted above, the success of France’s naval warfare strategy hinged on
its ability to recruit a sufficient number of individuals to serve as privateers on
behalf of France. Article 21 of the 1778 Treaty with France prohibited U.S.
citizens from taking “any commission or letters of marque for arming any ship
or ships, to act as privateers against” France.59 From France’s perspective,
though, it was entirely permissible for U.S. citizens to accept commissions
from France to act as privateers against France’s enemies. Hence, immediately
after Genet arrived in the United States, he began recruiting U.S. citizens to aid
France’s war effort by serving as captains or crew on French privateers.60
The United States told France that it viewed Genet’s recruitment of U.S.
citizens as a contravention of U.S. neutrality policy and urged France to halt
these activities.61 The August 1793 Treasury regulations instructed U.S.
customs collectors “to observe, and to notify . . . the case of any citizen of the
United States who shall be found in the service of either of the parties at
war.”62 In accordance with the President’s neutrality proclamation,63 federal
prosecutors brought criminal charges against U.S. citizens who enlisted to
serve on French privateers.64
Some critics expressed doubts about the President’s constitutional
authority to impose criminal penalties for violations of rules promulgated by
59. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XXI.
60. See CASTO, supra note 5, at 45–47.
61. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 42.
62. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 140, 141.
63. The Proclamation expressly directed federal prosecutors to institute prosecutions
“against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate
the law of nations, with respect to the Powers at war, or any of them.” Proclamation of Neutrality
(Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 140. As a neutral nation, the United
States believed it had a duty under the law of nations to ensure that its citizens did not take up
arms against either side in the war. The instruction for federal prosecutors to prosecute
individuals who “violate the law of nations” was intended to fulfill this perceived duty. Whether
the law of nations actually prohibited U.S. citizens from taking up arms on behalf of France is
debatable. See CASTO, supra note 5, at 92–93.
64. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793) (No. 6360).
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the Executive Branch. In June 1794, Congress removed lingering doubts about
the constitutionality of federal criminal prosecutions by enacting legislation
that authorized criminal punishment. The legislation expressly authorized
criminal penalties for U.S. citizens who “accept[ed] and exercise[d] a
commission to serve a foreign prince or state in war,”65 and for those who
“enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince or state . . . as a marine
or seaman on board of any vessel of war . . . or privateer.”66
3.

Outfitting Ships in U.S. Ports

To implement its naval warfare strategy, France needed ships equipped for
naval warfare. Article 22 of the 1778 Treaty with France prohibited privateers
commissioned by France’s enemies from outfitting their ships in U.S. ports.67
France interpreted this provision to mean that privateers commissioned by
France were permitted to outfit their ships in U.S. ports.68 Hence, Genet
provided funding to French privateers to help them purchase civilian ships and
convert them into military vessels by equipping the ships with guns and other
armaments.
The United States objected to France’s use of U.S. ports for this purpose,
arguing that it would be contrary to the United States’ duties as a neutral nation
to allow France to outfit privateers in U.S. ports without also granting
equivalent privileges to France’s enemies.69 Accordingly, the August 1793
Treasury regulations declared: “The original arming and equipping of vessels
in the ports of the United States, by any of the belligerent parties, for military
service . . . is deemed unlawful.”70 The regulations instructed U.S. customs
collectors to keep “a vigilant eye upon whatever may be passing within the
ports,” and to notify the relevant governor and U.S. Attorney if they observed
activities inconsistent with U.S. neutrality.71
Finally, the June 1794 legislation included three provisions to address the
problem of illegal outfitting in U.S. ports. First, the statute made it a crime for
any person within U.S. territory to “fit out and arm . . . any ship or vessel with
intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign
prince or state to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens or

65. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381, 381–82.
66. Id. § 2.
67. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XXII.
68. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 126–28.
69. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 239 (“In the case where we found ourselves obliged, by treaty, to withhold from
the enemies of France the right of arming in our ports, we thought ourselves in justice bound to
withhold the same right from France also, and we did it.”).
70. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 140, 141.
71. See id. at 140.
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property of another foreign prince or state with whom the United States are at
peace.”72 The statute also imposed similar penalties for anyone who
augmented or increased “the force of any ship of war, cruiser or other armed
vessel” in the service of a foreign state that was at war with a state “with whom
the United States are at peace, by adding to the number or size of the guns of
such vessel.”73 Additionally, the statute authorized the President to detain any
vessel that had been illegally outfitted, or whose force had been illegally
augmented, in a U.S. port.74
In sum, during the period from February 1793 to June 1794, the Executive
Branch played the lead role in framing the substantive rules governing the
conduct of French privateers in the United States. Congress later ratified key
executive branch decisions by enacting legislation in June 1794 that gave the
force of law to policies adopted by the Executive Branch the previous year.
The Supreme Court did not make a significant contribution to the substantive
rules governing the conduct of French privateers. However, in February 1794,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Executive’s earlier decision concerning
French prize courts by declaring “that the admiralty jurisdiction, which has
been exercised in the United States by the Consuls of France . . . is not of
right.”75
C. Jurisdictional Issues Involving French Privateers
There were several cases in which owners of vessels captured by French
privateers alleged that the capture was unlawful because the privateer seized
the alleged prize within U.S. territorial waters or because the alleged prize was
actually a neutral ship, not an enemy ship. France conceded that the law of
nations prohibited captures of neutral vessels and captures in U.S. territorial
waters. Cases in which ship owners alleged violations of these agreed rules
raised factual disputes about the ownership of ostensibly neutral vessels and
the location where captures occurred.
More fundamentally, though, these cases raised jurisdictional questions
about who should decide the factual disputes. The ship owners who
complained about unlawful captures of their vessels pursued two different
avenues of relief. Some took their claims to federal admiralty courts. Others
72. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 3, 1 Stat. 381, 383.
73. Id. § 4.
74. Id. § 7.
75. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (emphasis omitted). By holding
that French consuls lacked jurisdiction to operate prize courts on U.S. territory, the Supreme
Court effectively denied res judicata effect to the prior judgments of French prize courts, thereby
creating an opportunity for the owners of captured vessels to challenge the validity of (French)
judgments condemning the vessels as prizes. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 86
(1995).
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sought relief from the federal Executive Branch. From France’s perspective,
the disputes between ship owners and French privateers were properly viewed
as disputes between sovereign nations about the conduct of naval warfare.
Hence, France urged resolution through diplomatic channels. Initially, the
lower federal courts accepted France’s arguments and dismissed several cases
for lack of jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court ruled in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by ship owners who alleged
that their vessels had been seized unlawfully by French privateers.76 The
Court’s decision reflected a very different conception of the privateering cases:
the Court viewed these cases as disputes between private parties about
individual property rights. Viewed from that perspective, it made sense for the
Judicial Branch to resolve these disputes. After the Court’s decision in Sloop
Betsey, the Executive Branch consistently refused to intervene in judicial
proceedings, maintaining that the judiciary should handle all disputes about
seizures of particular vessels by particular French privateers. Although France
protested vehemently against the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts, the
Executive Branch rebuffed French protests and told French diplomats to direct
their arguments to the Judicial Branch. Executive officers trusted the courts to
resolve disputed cases in accordance with settled rules of international law, and
they assumed that the judicial application of international legal rules would
help promote the U.S. goal of avoiding war with Great Britain and France.
This section examines the evolution of jurisdictional rules related to the
French privateering cases in the period from April 1793 to June 1794. The
first subsection discusses the role of the Executive Branch. The next
subsection examines decisions by lower federal courts before the Supreme
Court decision in Sloop Betsey. The third subsection reviews the Supreme
Court decision in Sloop Betsey. The final subsection briefly considers the role
of Congress.
1.

The Role of the Executive Branch

In late April 1793, the French naval vessel L’Embuscade captured a British
vessel, The Grange, within the Bay of Delaware.77 Under accepted principles
of the law of nations, there was no question “that to attack an enemy in a
neutral territory is absolutely unlawful.”78 Hence, the capture of The Grange
raised two questions. As a factual matter, where did the capture occur? And

76. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 16.
77. See Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 31–35; Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas
Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 149, 150.
78. See Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 32.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

162

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:145

as a legal matter, what were the boundaries of U.S. territorial waters? After
investigating and analyzing these issues, Attorney General Randolph
concluded that the capture occurred in U.S. territorial waters (i.e., neutral
territory), and that “the duty arising from the illegal act[] is restitution.”79 In
deference to that judgment, Genet agreed that The Grange would be returned
to its British owners.80
The Grange was one of the few cases, though, where the Executive Branch
performed the adjudicative function of deciding that the capture of a specific
vessel was unlawful. After the United States resolved the case of The Grange,
it soon became apparent that there would be many such cases to resolve, and
the Executive grew uncomfortable with repeated demands from the French and
British Ambassadors, asking the Executive to perform what it believed was an
adjudicative function. Within a period of a few days in June 1793, Secretary
of State Jefferson received formal protests from the British concerning The
Catharine and from the French concerning The William. These protests forced
the Cabinet to reconsider the respective roles of the Executive and Judicial
Branches in handling these disputes.
First, on June 11, 1793, George Hammond, Great Britain’s Ambassador to
the United States, wrote to Thomas Jefferson to protest the seizure by French
captors of the British brigantine Catharine within the territorial waters of the
United States.81 Hammond requested “immediate restitution of this vessel” on
the grounds that the seizure was “an aggression on the territory and jurisdiction
of the United States.”82 The Cabinet met the next day to formulate a U.S.
response. They reached a unanimous agreement that the matter should be
resolved by judicial means.83 Jefferson wrote to Hammond to convey the U.S.
views. Jefferson asked Hammond “to have the parties interested apprised
without delay that they are to take measures as in ordinary civil cases for the
support of their rights judicially.”84 The letter continued:
Should the decision be in favor of the jurisdiction of the court, it will follow
that all future similar cases will devolve at once on the individuals interested to
be taken care of by themselves, as in other questions of private property
provided for by the laws. . . . This train of things is much more desireable for

79. Id. at 35.
80. See Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 149, 150.
81. Memorial from George Hammond (June 11, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 253.
82. Id.
83. Cabinet Opinions on the Republican and the Catharine (June 12, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 259–60.
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 270.
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the Executive, whose functions are not analogous to the questions of law and
85
fact produced by these cases . . . .

Two points are noteworthy. First, the Executive Branch preferred for the
courts to resolve these cases because the cases involved private property rights
and the application of law to fact. Second, it was the judiciary’s responsibility
to decide whether these were matters within the jurisdiction of federal
admiralty courts.86
Jefferson sent this letter to Hammond on June 13. Then, on June 14,
Ambassador Genet wrote to Jefferson to protest the seizure of The William by
U.S. judicial officers: “You will see by the papers hereto annexed, that, in
contempt of the treaties which unite the French and Americans; that in
contempt of the law of nations; civil and judiciary officers of the United States
have permitted themselves” to seize prizes captured by French privateers.87
Genet added: “I hope to obtain immediately . . . restitution, with damages and
interest, of the French prizes arrested and seized at Philadelphia, by an
incompetent judge . . . .”88 Genet also made clear that France believed these
types of disputes should be resolved through diplomatic means, not through
private adjudication. He wrote: “It is through the intervention of the public
ministers, that affairs of the nature which produce my present complaints and
reclamations, ought to be treated.”89 This was consistent with France’s
litigating position in these cases, which emphasized that disputes related to
French privateers were, first and foremost, disputes involving sovereign
rights.90

85. Id. at 270–71.
86. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 704.
87. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 152.
88. Id. The events preceding Genet’s letter to Jefferson merit brief comment. In the spring
of 1793, the French privateer Citizen Genet captured a British ship, The William, and brought it to
Philadelphia. The British owners filed an in rem action in federal court, alleging that the capture
was illegal because the ship was seized in U.S. territorial waters. Findlay v. The William, 9 F.
Cas. 57 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790). Meanwhile, on June 7, 1793, an agent for the French captors
proceeded to sell the cargo at a wharf in Philadelphia. Statement of Francis Dupont (June 7,
1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 152. In an effort to establish the court’s jurisdiction over
the ship and its cargo, “a deputy marshal of the court of admiralty” attempted to halt the sale of
the cargo. Id. The agent for the French captors believed “that the admiralty could not . . . meddle
in this business, agreeably to the 17th article of the treaty of commerce between France and the
United States.” Id. The agent proceeded to sell the cargo, but it allegedly sold below market
value because the deputy marshal “discouraged the bidders, and even suspended their bidding.”
Id.
89. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 152.
90. See infra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
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Jefferson drafted a letter in response to Genet’s protest, which included the
following passage:
The functions of the Executive are not competent to the decision of Questions
of property between Individuals. These are ascribed to the Judiciary
alone . . . . You will therefore be sensible, Sir, that though the President is not
the Organ for doing what is just in the present case, it will be effectually done
by those to whom the constitution has ascribed that duty; and be assured that
the interests, the rights and the dignity of the French nation will receive within
the Bosom of the United States all the support which a friendly nation could
91
desire, and a neutral one yield.

Jefferson did not send the letter in this form,92 but his draft identifies an
important element of the consensus position that later emerged. Even though
the French privateering cases implicated “the interests, the rights and the
dignity of the French nation,” the judiciary had the constitutional responsibility
for vindicating France’s interests, because the cases also involved “Questions
of property between Individuals.”
On June 21, one week after Genet wrote to Jefferson, Judge Richard
Peters, the federal district judge in Philadelphia, ruled that the district court
lacked jurisdiction in the case of The William.93 Jefferson sent his reply to
Genet after the district court issued its ruling. In that letter, Jefferson told
Genet:
The persons who reclaimed the ship William as taken within the limits of the
protection of the United States, having thought proper to carry their claim first
into the courts of admiralty, there was no power in this country which could
take the vessel out of the custody of that court, till it should decide, itself,
94
whether it had jurisdiction or not of the cause . . . .

Jefferson’s reply is noteworthy for two reasons. First, if an individual files an
in rem action in an admiralty court, and the court seizes a vessel on that basis,
the Executive has no power to order the court to release the vessel,
notwithstanding French protests that the seizure violates U.S. treaty obligations
owed to France. Second, questions about the jurisdiction of U.S. courts were
matters to be decided by the Judicial Branch, without interference from the
Executive Branch.95

91. Draft Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 301–02.
92. See id. at 302.
93. The William, 9 F. Cas. at 61–62.
94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 29, 1793), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 161.
95. This, of course, assumes that Congress has not exercised its legislative power to clarify
the scope of federal court jurisdiction.
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Early Decisions by Lower Courts

Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Sloop Betsey, the lower courts
generally held that they lacked jurisdiction to entertain claims by ship owners
who alleged that their vessels had been seized unlawfully by French privateers.
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Sloop Betsey that the lower courts did
have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. However, the Supreme Court
provided virtually no rationale for its decision. Hence, to understand the
Supreme Court decision in Sloop Betsey, it is helpful first to examine the prior
lower court decisions.
Published documents contain fairly detailed
information about four district court cases decided before the Supreme Court
decision in Sloop Betsey. The federal district court in Pennsylvania decided
Findlay v. The William96 and Moxon v. The Fanny,97 both of which are
published in the “federal cases” collection. The district court in New York
decided Meade v. The Brigantine Catharine, which was published
contemporaneously as a stand-alone volume.98 Finally, the Maryland District
Court’s opinion in Sloop Betsey is reproduced in The Documentary History of
the Supreme Court of the United States.99 This section analyzes these four
district court opinions.
All four cases originated when French privateers captured merchant
vessels and brought them into U.S. ports. The William, The Fanny, and The
Catharine were British vessels, and were thus enemy property. The libellants
in those cases alleged, inter alia, that the captures were unlawful because the
ships were seized in neutral territory, specifically, in U.S. territorial waters.
The Betsey was a Swedish vessel.100 The libellants in that case alleged that the
capture was unlawful because Sweden was a neutral country. The substantive
law governing these claims was undisputed: it was clearly illegal under the law
of nations to capture a neutral vessel or to capture an enemy vessel in neutral
territory. The main dispute in all four cases revolved around the question
whether U.S. admiralty courts had jurisdiction to entertain the claims. In all
four cases, the district courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction.

96. 9 F. Cas. at 57.
97. 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895).
98. DECREE ON THE ADMIRALTY SIDE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF NEW YORK, IN WHICH
THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NEUTRALITY CONCERNING CAPTURES WITHIN NEUTRAL
BOUNDS; AND THE TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE NEUTRAL COURTS, AS FAR AS THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY
CONNECTED WITH THAT SUBJECT ARE CONSIDERED (1794) [hereinafter The Catharine] (copy on
file with author) (publishing the decision in Meade v. The Brigantine Catharine). All page
references for The Catharine refer to the author’s copy.
99. See 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 324–32.
100. The French captors alleged that The Betsey was British property, and hence subject to
seizure as enemy property. See Plea to the Jurisdiction, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 320–21.
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The French captors raised four main objections to the exercise of
jurisdiction by U.S. courts.101 First, they argued “[t]hat, by the laws of nations
. . . a neutral nation has no right to be the judge, either of the lawfulness of the
war between belligerent powers, or of their conduct towards each other in the
prosecution of hostilities.”102 Accordingly, under the law of nations, “the
courts of the nation to which the captor belongs” have exclusive jurisdiction to
decide whether a captured vessel is a lawful prize.103 The district courts in The
William, The Fanny, and Sloop Betsey all accepted this argument, and agreed
that the law of nations precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts.104
Second, the French captors invoked Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty between
the United States and France as a bar to jurisdiction. The Treaty stipulates:
It shall be lawful for the ships of war of either party, and privateers, freely to
carry whithersoever they please, the ships and goods taken from their
enemies . . . nor shall such prizes be arrested or seized when they come to and
enter the ports of either party; nor shall the . . . officers of those places . . .
105
make examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes . . . .

The Treaty appears to bar in rem jurisdiction over the prizes (“nor shall such
prizes be arrested or seized”), as well as subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute (precluding officers from making “examination concerning the
lawfulness of such prizes”). Hence, the French captors relied heavily on
Article 17 to support their arguments against the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.106
However, of the four district court decisions under review here, The Fanny was
the only case in which the court gave much weight to the treaty argument to
support its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction.107 In contrast, the district
court in The Catharine expressly rejected the French interpretation of the

101. The French refused to participate in judicial proceedings in The Catharine. See The
Catharine, supra note 98, at 4. Hence, the summary of arguments adduced by French captors is
based on the other three cases.
102. Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57, 58 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 61 (“[A]ffairs of prizes are only cognizable in the courts of the power making
the capture . . . .”); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 946 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (“Neutral
courts . . . are not clothed with authority to vindicate or carry on national contests . . . .”); Sloop
Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 325 (“[Q]uestions relative to such captures, as prize, can
only be determined by the admiralty-courts belonging to that power, whose subjects make the
capture.”).
105. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII.
106. See The William, 9 F. Cas. at 58; The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944 (contending “that the
treaty forbids the courts from interfering”); Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 321
(quoting the Treaty and arguing “that the said prize ought not to be arrested or seized or the
lawfulness of the said prize enquired into by the United States or any of its Courts of Justice”).
107. See The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 947 (“The treaty with France . . . insisted on by the
captors . . . has its due weight with me; but only in cases evidently comprehended in it. And it
appears to me that this case is one of them . . . .”).
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Treaty, concluding that the word “prizes” in Article 17 refers only “to captures
on the high seas, according to the rights of war,” and not to captures in neutral
territory.108
In addition to arguments based on the law of nations and the Treaty with
France, the French captors also argued, in effect, that the ship owners were not
the proper plaintiffs to bring these claims. In their view, the allegation that a
seizure occurred in neutral territory, if true, “did not give rights to [private]
parties at war, but merely affected the neutral nation.”109 Therefore, “the
parties libellants . . . had no power to sue and recover on the point of violation
of territory.”110 The district courts in The Fanny and The Catharine agreed
with this argument: “I can find no sufficient reason for reducing the violation
of a territory to the level of a private injury against an individual who has
incidentally suffered a wrong. The offence consists in the affront to the state,
by an attack upon its sovereignty . . . .”111
Finally, the French captors argued that separation of powers considerations
precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts. For example, in The
William, the French captors contended that any infringement of the territorial
sovereignty of a neutral party “must be canvassed by the diplomatic body, and
finally settled by the sovereigns,” but it could not be the subject of a “judiciary
enquiry.”112 In The William, The Fanny, The Catharine, and Sloop Betsey, the
district judges all agreed that “complaints of this kind . . . must be preferred to
the executive power of the United States, and not to the admiralty-courts.”113
However, in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court rejected this
conclusion.
3.

The Supreme Court

In Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the French appellees raised many of the same
objections to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts that had been raised in the district
courts in The William, The Fanny, The Catharine, and Sloop Betsey.114 They
also raised one other objection: they argued that there was no federal statute
that conferred jurisdiction on the federal district court. Section 9 of the 1789

108. See The Catharine, supra note 98, at 13–19.
109. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944.
110. Id.
111. The Catharine, supra note 98, at 30; accord The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 946.
112. The William, 9 F. Cas. at 58; see also The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944 (acknowledging “that
a capture in a neutral territory was an offense to the neutral . . . [b]ut this is a matter of state
policy, not of judicial proceeding”).
113. Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 332; accord The William, 9 F. Cas. at 61
(“[W]hen two powers have any difference between them, the affair must be treated by
negotiation, and not through the instrumentality of their courts of justice.”); The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. at 946–47; The Catharine, supra note 98, at 19–35.
114. See Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 7–12 (1794).
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Judiciary Act granted federal district courts “exclusive original cognizance of
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”115 The appellees
argued that a prize case is not a “civil cause” within the meaning of the statute
because prize cases arise in wartime, not peace time.116 The appellants replied
that the term “civil” in the statute “is used . . . in contra-distinction to
criminal,” and that maritime captures during wartime are “civil causes” within
the meaning of the statute because they are not criminal cases.117 The Supreme
Court agreed with the appellants on this point, holding expressly that “every
District Court in the United States, possesses all the powers of a court of
Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court.”118
Like the French captors in the courts below, the French appellees in Sloop
Betsey contended: (1) that the libellants’ allegations should be addressed
through diplomatic channels, not by adjudication in U.S. courts;119 (2) “[t]hat
by the law of nations, the courts of the captor can alone determine the question
of prize, or no prize”;120 and (3) that “[t]he interference of the American courts
will be a manifest violation of the 17th article of the treaty with France.”121
The Supreme Court did not rule expressly on any of these arguments. Even so,
the Court did hold expressly “that the District Court of Maryland . . . has
jurisdiction competent to enquire, and to decide, whether, in the present case,
restitution ought to be made to the claimants.”122 In so holding, the Court
implicitly rejected all three of the aforementioned arguments against
jurisdiction. Thus, to understand the reasoning behind the Court’s decision, it
is helpful to consider the appellants’ reply to each of these three points.
First, the appellants noted that Article 17 of the Treaty, by its terms,
applies only to “the ships and goods taken from their enemies.”123 Therefore,
they argued, “being in the affirmative, as to enemies, it affords a strong
implication of a negative as to neutrals.”124 In other words, assuming that
Article 17 limits the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the limitation does not apply to
cases, like Sloop Betsey, where the libellants claim that the captured vessel is
115. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
116. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 7–8.
117. See id. at 12–13 (emphasis omitted).
118. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
119. Id. at 8–9.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 11. The French appellees added: “To decide in opposition to a
compact, so unequivocal and unambiguous, would endanger the national tranquility, by giving a
just and honorable cause of war to the French Republic.” Id. at 11–12 (emphasis omitted). This
statement proved to be prophetic, because French allegations that the United States repeatedly
violated Article 17 ultimately became a key factor that led to the so-called “quasi-war” between
the United States and France. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
122. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
123. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII.
124. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 12.
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neutral property. In such cases, the district court can exercise jurisdiction at
least for the limited purpose of determining whether the captured vessel
belongs to a neutral country or a nation at war with France. By holding that
the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court implicitly
accepted this argument. Strictly speaking, though, the Court’s decision in
Sloop Betsey did not address the treaty-based objection to jurisdiction in cases
like The William, The Fanny, and The Catharine, where the libellants alleged
that the privateers seized enemy property in U.S. territorial waters.125
Second, the appellants effectively conceded that, under the law of nations,
the prize courts of the captor’s nation have exclusive jurisdiction to condemn a
captured vessel as a lawful prize. Nevertheless, the libellants had argued in the
district court that although “the power to condemn belongs properly to the
nation of the captor . . . the case before the court is not of a libel to condemn,
but of a libel for acquittal and restitution; and . . . the courts of a neutral nation
may sustain such a libel.”126 In other words, under the law of nations, the
courts of a neutral nation cannot exercise jurisdiction over a prize case filed by
a privateer who seeks a judgment that the captured vessel is a lawful prize, but
they can exercise jurisdiction over a marine trespass case filed by the owner of
a captured vessel who seeks restitution of the captured property.127 By holding
that the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court
implicitly accepted this argument.128 In contrast to the treaty argument
discussed above, this argument applies equally to cases in which a libellant
alleges that a privateer captured enemy property in neutral territory.129
125. In a letter to Gouverneur Morris, then the U.S. Ambassador to France, Jefferson
contended that Article 17 applied only to captures of enemy vessels on the high seas. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 702–04. If Jefferson was right, then enemy vessels in U.S.
territorial waters, like neutral vessels, would be outside the scope of Article 17.
126. Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 328 (emphasis omitted).
127. The presentation of appellants’ argument on this point by the Supreme Court reporter,
Alexander Dallas, is not as lucid as it might have been, but Dallas’ report of the case does show
that they made this argument. See Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 15.
128. The Court’s opinion states “that every District Court in the United States, possesses all
the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court.” Id. at
16 (emphasis omitted). In adjudicating a marine trespass case, like Sloop Betsey, the district court
was sitting as an instance court to decide, as the appellants stated, the question of “[r]estitution or
no restitution.” Id. at 6. However, the implication of the Supreme Court’s statement is that, once
convened as an instance court, the district court also has the jurisdiction “to try every incidental
question,” id. at 6, including the question of whether the seizure of the vessel was legal under the
law of nations (which would ordinarily be tried in a prize court).
129. Professor Casto contends that the Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue was
inconsistent with “settled legal doctrine.” See CASTO, supra note 75, at 85. Granted, there was
an established rule under the law of nations that the question of “prize or no prize” was to be
decided by the courts of the captor’s nation. However, as Jefferson noted six months before the
Court decided Sloop Betsey, the law of nations also obligated the United States to extend its
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Finally, the appellants devoted most of their argument to showing that,
under the U.S. Constitution, the Judicial Branch, not the Executive Branch, is
responsible for adjudicating cases like Sloop Betsey. The appellees argued that
the alleged injury “is an attack upon the sovereignty of Sweden,” and that
therefore the individual libellants must seek redress from the sovereign.130 The
appellants replied as follows:
[T]he Legislative, Judicial, and Executive powers . . . in the contemplation of
our Constitution, are each a branch of the sovereignty. . . . The Constitution
designates the portion of sovereignty to be exercised by the Judicial
department; and . . . renders it sovereign, as to determinations upon property,
whenever the property is within its reach. . . . To the Judicial, and not to the
Executive, department, the citizen, or subject, naturally looks for
131
determinations upon his property . . . .

By holding that the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme
Court endorsed the view that the wartime capture of private property
implicated not only sovereign rights, but also private rights, and that disputes
about private rights were properly directed to the judiciary, not the Executive
Branch.132
The Court’s decision in Sloop Betsey could be interpreted narrowly to
mean only that federal district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in
which libellants allege the capture of a neutral vessel. However, as discussed
below, the courts subsequently interpreted Sloop Betsey to mean that federal
district courts had jurisdiction to entertain all claims of illegal seizures by
French privateers. Hence, Sloop Betsey was significant because it enabled
France’s enemies to utilize the U.S. judicial system to file in rem actions
alleging unlawful captures by French privateers. When ship owners filed in
rem actions, the courts would seize the captured vessels and force the

protection to foreign vessels in U.S. waters. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur
Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 703–
04. In effect, the Court decided in Sloop Betsey that the U.S. obligation under the law of nations
to protect neutral shipping took precedence over the rule that would otherwise have barred the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. This decision was consistent with the position adopted by the U.S.
Executive Branch. In this author’s view, the Court’s decision was a reasonable way to reconcile
two conflicting rules of international law, although it would have been preferable if the Court had
explained its rationale.
130. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 8–9 (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. at 13–14.
132. In several of the French privateer cases, the privateers detained the captain and crew of
the captured vessels as prisoners. The appellants in Sloop Betsey argued that the necessity to
decide on the detention of prisoners was another reason why the case should be resolved by the
judiciary, not the Executive Branch. See id. at 14 (“And shall even American citizens be detained
prisoners in our own harbours, depending for their liberty upon the will of a secretary of state?”).
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the Supreme Court may have been swayed by this
argument.
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privateers to defend their property claims in court, thereby disrupting the
privateers’ naval warfare activities. In sum, when the French attempted to gain
a tactical military advantage by extending the battlefield to U.S. ports, their
enemies responded by forcing France to fight the war in U.S. courts. By
holding that the Judicial Branch, not the Executive Branch, was the proper
forum for the resolution of these disputes, the Supreme Court facilitated the
implementation of this strategy by France’s enemies.
4.

The Role of Congress

The Court held explicitly in Sloop Betsey that federal district courts had
jurisdiction over claims involving captures of neutral vessels. The decision
also implied that courts had jurisdiction over claims involving captures in U.S.
territorial waters. To remove any possible ambiguity on that point, Congress
enacted legislation in June 1794 stipulating “[t]hat the district courts shall take
cognizance of complaints by whomsoever instituted, in cases of captures made
within the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts
or shores thereof.”133 With this legislation, Congress endorsed the view,
already adopted by the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch, that the
federal courts were a proper forum for resolving claims by individual ship
owners that their ships had been captured unlawfully by French privateers.
III. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAWFARE: FROM JUNE 1794 TO FEBRUARY 1797
After Congress enacted the June 1794 legislation, there was a distinct
change in the nature of the claims raised by ship owners who challenged the
legality of captures made by French privateers. Before June 1794, the ship
owners generally alleged that the privateers had violated the law of nations by
capturing a neutral vessel or by making a capture in U.S. territorial waters.
After June 1794, the ship owners generally alleged that the privateers had
violated federal statutes by outfitting their vessels in U.S. ports or by recruiting
U.S. citizens as crew members. Although the June 1794 legislation prohibited
outfitting of privateers in U.S. ports and recruitment of U.S. citizens,134 it did
not authorize private lawsuits to enforce those rules, nor did it explicitly
authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over such claims. Moreover, it
is debatable whether the French privateers were violating the law of nations by
recruiting U.S. citizens or by outfitting their ships in U.S. ports.135
Part III examines the U.S. response to this second wave of French
privateering cases in the period from June 1794 to February 1797, when the
Supreme Court decided the last French privateering case.136 During this
133.
134.
135.
136.

Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 381, 384.
Id.
See infra notes 215–26 and accompanying text.
Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797).
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period, the Supreme Court decided twenty-three cases related to French
privateering activities in the United States.137 To appreciate fully the
significance of those cases, it is necessary to view them simultaneously from
three different angles. First, the privateering cases involved disputes between
private parties over ownership of private property. Second, the cases involved
an ongoing diplomatic dispute between the United States and France over the
proper interpretation and application of Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with
France. Third, the cases involved a tactical ploy by Great Britain and other
enemies of France to utilize the U.S. judicial system to harass French
privateers and to undermine France’s naval warfare strategy (which relied
heavily on the use of privateers).
The distribution of decision-making responsibility during this period can
be summarized briefly as follows. The federal judiciary was the primary
decision maker with respect to the major issues raised by the French
privateering cases. The Executive Branch performed two main functions
during this period: it listened to French grievances when French diplomats
complained that U.S. courts were violating Article 17; and it explained U.S.
judicial decisions to French diplomats in an attempt to justify those decisions.
Meanwhile, Congress did not enact any significant legislation related to French
privateering between June 1794 and February 1797. This division of decisionmaking responsibility stemmed, in part, from a failure to view the cases from
all three angles mentioned above. The U.S. government viewed the cases
primarily as disputes about private property; that is why the judiciary took the
lead role in resolving the cases. The Executive Branch was well aware of
French grievances about violations of Article 17, but the Executive trusted the
judiciary to address those grievances in the ordinary course of litigation.
The analysis suggests that judicial decision making in the privateering
cases was a key factor that contributed to the deterioration of U.S. diplomatic
relations with France. France became increasingly agitated by judicial
decisions that, in its view, not only violated Article 17, but also interfered with
France’s naval strategy by disrupting the activities of French privateers.
Moreover, France was exasperated by the Executive’s refusal to intervene in
ongoing judicial proceedings. By the end of 1796, France had initiated a series
of measures—intended partly to retaliate against the United States for alleged
violations of Article 17—that ultimately led to the outbreak of the so-called
“quasi-war” between the United States and France.138
137. See infra Part III.B (presenting an overview of the cases).
138. It is clear from the diplomatic correspondence of the era that France’s allegation that the
United States repeatedly violated Article 17 was one of the key French grievances that led to the
quasi-war. See, e.g., Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 579–83; Letter from Charles De la Croix to James Monroe (Dec. 11,
1796), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 746–47. However, the leading history of the quasi-war, in
providing a summary of French grievances, curiously omits any reference to the alleged U.S.
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The analysis in Part III is divided into four sections. The first section
explains how France’s enemies utilized the U.S. judicial system to thwart
France’s naval warfare strategy. The second section provides an overview of
the privateering cases decided by the Supreme Court during this period. The
third section provides case studies of two cases to show how judicial decisions
in the privateering cases became a primary focus of U.S. diplomacy with
France. The final section contends that judicial decision making by U.S. courts
was one of three key factors that ultimately persuaded French privateers to stop
bringing their prizes to U.S. ports.
A.

Litigation as a Means of Warfare

In March 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations defined “lawfare” as “a
strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means
to achieve military objectives.”139 The report described lawfare as a “new
phenomenon” and warned of associated dangers.140 In fact, lawfare is not a
new phenomenon. In the period from 1794 to 1797, Great Britain (and to a
lesser extent France’s other enemies) successfully utilized a lawfare strategy to
counter the military maneuvers of French privateers who were using American
ports as a base of operations for naval warfare.
Between June 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided
thirteen cases in which British consuls filed in rem suits seeking restitution of
British merchant vessels captured by French privateers.141 The British consuls

treaty violations. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY
at 9–10 (1966).
139. Council on Foreign Relations, Lawfare: The Latest in Asymmetries (Mar. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772.
140. Id.
141. These thirteen cases include four published decisions and nine unpublished decisions.
The published decisions are: Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796);
Moodie v. The Ship Alfred, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796); Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302
(1796); and Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796). The unpublished
decisions are: Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed
on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Eliza
(Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), microformed on Appellate
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Favorite (No. 22),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The
Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm
Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); and Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25),
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications). For further
discussion, see infra notes 162–79 and accompanying text.

OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801,
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lost twelve of those thirteen cases.142 Even so, Benjamin Moodie, the British
consul in South Carolina who filed eleven of the thirteen cases, was quite
satisfied with the results. Since these were in rem actions, the courts typically
retained custody of the captured property (or the funds from the sale of the
property) for twelve to eighteen months while judicial proceedings were
pending.143 Thus, by filing in rem actions in U.S. district courts, and then
filing appeals in the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, the libellants
successfully detained the privateers’ property for extended periods of time and
made it difficult for the privateers to initiate additional attacks on enemy
merchant vessels.144 Hence, in April 1796, when most of these cases were
pending before the Supreme Court, Moodie wrote that he was “fully convinced
that the detention of such considerable Sums during the Proceedings in the
different Courts has had as much if not greater effect in saving British Property
than even the Success of his Majesty’s Cruizers.”145
French diplomats understood the British lawfare strategy and its
consequences for French privateering. They protested vehemently that the
United States was undermining France’s war effort by allowing U.S. courts to
seize the assets of French privateers. Thus, for example, the French
Ambassador, Pierre Adet, wrote a lengthy diatribe to the U.S. Secretary of
State, Timothy Pickering, which included the following statement:
[W]hen the Powers at war with the republic had the privilege . . . of causing to
be arrested the privateers and their prizes, of detaining them in the ports of the
United States, of ruining them by considerable costs, by the excessive
expenses which they occasioned them, they drew from that privilege an
immense advantage to the detriment of France[.] Doubtless, it was of little
import to them that sometimes the privateers obtained justice, in the last resort,
if they detained the privateer for a length of time, and if they, by that means,
146
sheltered from their pursuit the commerce of the enemy of France.

142. The one exception was Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. 302 (1796).
143. See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
144. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), Justice Jackson wrote: “It would be
difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he
is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his
efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.” Id. at
779. This is effectively what the British consuls accomplished by forcing French privateers to
defend admiralty actions in U.S. courts. The commanders of French privateering vessels were
forced to remain on land to handle legal proceedings. Moreover, since the courts typically
detained the proceeds from the sale of prizes while the suits were pending, the commanders may
not have had adequate funds to pay their crews until the courts agreed to release the funds.
145. Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Phineas Bond (Apr. 23, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note
8, at 128–29.
146. Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 579, 580.
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It is noteworthy that Ambassador Adet wrote this letter in November 1796.
During the February and August sessions in 1796, the Supreme Court decided
sixteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits seeking
restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers.147 The
French privateers won fifteen of the sixteen cases on the grounds that Article
17 of the 1778 Treaty with France barred the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S.
courts.148 Thus, Adet’s protest came on the heels of what could be viewed as a
remarkably pro-French set of decisions by the Supreme Court. Even so,
France alleged that U.S. courts were violating Article 17 by exercising
jurisdiction, even temporarily, before they ultimately dismissed the libels for
lack of jurisdiction.149 Thus, for example, in the same November 1796 letter,
Adet wrote “[t]hat the 17th article of the treaty of 1778, has been violated; that,
in contempt of this article, the American tribunals have been permitted to take
cognizance of the validity of prizes made by French ships of war and
privateers.”150 In sum, from France’s perspective, U.S. courts were violating
treaty obligations owed to France and thwarting France’s military strategy by
disrupting the naval warfare activities of French privateers.
When French diplomats lodged their complaints with senior U.S. executive
officials, seeking diplomatic solutions for foreign affairs controversies, U.S.
executive officials told the French diplomats that the federal judiciary was the
branch of government responsible for deciding these issues. For example, in
June 1795, French Ambassador Fauchet (Adet’s predecessor) wrote to
Secretary of State Randolph (Pickering’s predecessor), presenting a litany of
complaints related to French privateers.151 In particular, Fauchet complained
that U.S. courts detained valid French prizes based on the mere allegation that
that they had been captured illegally.152 To address this problem, he suggested
that, before judicial proceedings could commence, there should be prior
“intervention of the Executive upon the simple question—is there ground for
prosecution or not?”153 Secretary Randolph replied as follows:

147. This figure of sixteen cases includes the thirteen cases cited supra note 141.
Additionally, this figure includes two published decisions—Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306 (1796), and Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796)—as well as one unpublished
decision: Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications).
148. The one exception was Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796).
149. For a legal analysis of Article 17, as applied to these cases, see infra Part III.C.1.
150. Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 579, 582.
151. See Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (June 8, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 614–17.
152. Id. at 614–15.
153. Id. at 615.
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The courts of justice exercise the sovereignty of this country in judiciary
matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to control nor opposition from
any other branch of the Government. . . .
....
The previous inquiry by the Executive, which you have suggested, could
only contribute to delay. For, if the President were even to decide that a prize
ought not to be prosecuted in our courts, the decision would be treated as an
intrusion by those courts, and the judicial proceedings would go on
154
notwithstanding. So speak the constitution and the law.

This exchange between Fauchet and Randolph was characteristic of the
diplomatic dialogue between France and the United States in the period under
study. From France’s perspective, issues related to French privateering were
foreign policy issues to be resolved diplomatically between the executives of
the two countries. The United States recognized the foreign affairs
significance of the privateering cases, but it also recognized that the cases
could legitimately be seen as disputes between private parties involving
competing claims to ownership of property. Viewed in this light, cabinet
officers thought it proper to defer to the judiciary and to allow U.S. courts to
resolve the disputes without intervention by the Executive Branch.155
B.

An Overview of Supreme Court Cases

Between June 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided a total
of twenty-three cases that are relevant to this study. The total of twenty-three
cases includes eighteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem
suits seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French
privateers.156 The five cases that do not fit this description are: Del Col v.
Arnold,157 Hills v. Ross,158 United States v. La Vengeance,159 MacDonogh v.

154. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (June 13, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 617, 618. Before this letter could be delivered to Fauchet, Adet replaced him as the
French Ambassador. Hence, the letter was addressed to Fauchet, but delivered to Adet. See id. at
617.
155. See, e.g., Letter from William Bradford, Jr. to Edmund Randolph (May 9, 1795), in 7
DHSC, supra note 8, at 53 (“Being therefore of opinion that the proceedings in these causes have
been regular, I presume they must wait the usual course of Judicial decision; & that any previous
interference on the part of the Executive would be improper & unavailing.”).
156. See infra notes 162–79. The term “enemy merchant vessels” refers to vessels belonging
to France’s enemies: Britain, Spain, and Holland.
157. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796). Del Col involved the capture by a French privateer of an
American ship, not an enemy ship. Additionally, the suit was filed as an in personam action, not
an in rem action, because the prize crew sank the captured vessel. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at
625–33.
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Dannery,160 and United States v. Peters.161 Peters is significant because it
established an important limitation on the jurisdiction of U.S. courts: they
could not exercise jurisdiction over private suits alleging unlawful captures
unless the French captors brought their prizes into U.S. ports. The other four
cases are noted for the sake of completeness, but they do not add anything
significant to our story.
The eighteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits
seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers
include eight published decisions and ten unpublished decisions. The eight
published decisions are: Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance,162 Moodie v. The

158. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 331 (1796); 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 184 (1796) (continuing the case to the next
term). Hills was an in personam action, not an in rem action, because the French captors sold the
prize before the ship owners filed suit for damages. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 683–93.
159. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). La Vengeance was an enforcement action against a French
privateer filed by a U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney sought forfeiture of the vessel, based on
allegations that the privateer had been illegally outfitted in U.S. territorial waters and had been
used to export arms and ammunition in violation of a federal statute. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8,
at 526–29.
160. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188 (1796). MacDonogh involved a British merchant ship captured by a
French naval vessel, not a French privateer. The litigation involved a three-way contest between
the French captors, the original British owners, and the crew of an American vessel that saved the
British ship, the Mary Ford, after she had been abandoned by her French captors. See 7 DHSC,
supra note 8, at 11–17.
161. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795). In Peters, the commander of a French warship filed a writ
of prohibition in the Supreme Court to prevent Richard Peters, the district judge for the District of
Pennsylvania, from exercising jurisdiction over a libel filed in that court by James Yard. See id.
at 121–25. Yard was a U.S. citizen. In his libel in the district court, Yard alleged that he was the
owner of the schooner William Lindsey, an American vessel, which had been captured illegally by
a French warship, the Cassius. Id. at 121–22. If the Cassius had brought the William Lindsey to
Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania district court could have exercised jurisdiction under the principle
announced in Sloop Betsey. However, the Cassius took the William Lindsey to Port de Paix, a
French port in the Caribbean. When the Cassius subsequently returned to Philadelphia without
the William Lindsey, Yard filed a libel and moved to attach the Cassius in an effort to secure
compensation for the damages he sustained as a result of the allegedly illegal capture of his
schooner. Id. Samuel Davis, the commander of the Cassius, responded by filing a writ of
prohibition in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the law of
nations and the Treaty with France precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction in a
case where a French warship had captured an American vessel and taken the captured vessel to a
French port. Id. at 129–32. For more details on the case, see 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 719–42.
162. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797). This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Perseverance, captured by the French privateer the Sans Pareil in July 1794. The libellant,
Thomas Jennings, was the British ship owner. He filed the libel in the U.S. district court in
Rhode Island in September 1794. The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in
August 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in June 1796, and by the Supreme
Court in February 1797. Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at
811–28. See also infra Part III.C.2.
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Ship Phoebe Anne,163 Moodie v. The Ship Alfred,164 Arcambal v. Wiseman,165
Cotton v. Wallace,166 Geyer v. Michel,167 Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart,168
163. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796). This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Phoebe Anne, captured by the French privateer La Mere Michel in April 1795. The libellant,
Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S.
district court in South Carolina in May 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district
court ruled in favor of the French captors in June 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit
court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about the case
is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 189–200; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 142–43; and from
the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
164. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796). This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Alfred, captured by the French privateer Le Brutus in March 1795. The libellant, Benjamin
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in
South Carolina in April 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in
favor of the French captors in May 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about the case is derived
from JACKSON, supra note 26, at 128–29, and from the author’s research in the Supreme Court
archives.
165. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). Arcambal v. Wiseman was an in rem action against a
Spanish vessel, Nuestra Senora del Carmen, captured by the French privateer Le Brutus in the
summer of 1795. The libellant, Joseph Wiseman, was the Spanish vice-consul in Rhode Island.
He filed the action, initially captioned Wiseman v. Nuestra Senora del Carmen, in the U.S. district
court in Rhode Island in August 1795 on behalf of the Spanish ship owners. Two claimants
contested the libel. Jean Gariscan, commander of Le Brutus, claimed ownership by capture, and
Louis Arcambal, the French vice-consul, sought recovery for France. The district court ruled
against the Spanish owners in May 1796. Since the vessel and cargo had been sold at auction, the
court ordered the proceeds from the sale (held in the court’s custody) to be divided between
Gariscan and Arcambal. Wiseman appealed the dismissal of his libel, and Arcambal appealed the
order concerning distribution of funds to Gariscan. The circuit court decided both appeals in June
1796, and the Supreme Court reached its own decision in August 1796. Both courts affirmed the
district court order dismissing the Spanish libel, but they reached inconsistent rulings regarding
the distribution of funds between Gariscan and Arcambal. Information about the case is derived
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 750–60.
166. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796). Cotton v. Wallace was an in rem action against a British
vessel, the Brig Everton, captured by the French privateer the Egalite in December 1794. The
libellant, John Wallace, was the British consul in Georgia. He filed the action, initially captioned
Wallace v. Brig Everton, in the U.S. district court in Georgia in January 1795 on behalf of the
British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor of the British owners in March 1795 on the
grounds that the Egalite had been illegally outfitted in the United States, in violation of U.S.
neutrality. John Cotton, one of the officers on the Egalite, appealed that decision to the circuit
court. The circuit court affirmed the district court decree in May 1795, and the Supreme Court
affirmed in March 1796. However, the Court postponed a decision on damages until the August
1796 term. Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 119–32.
167. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796). This was an in rem action against a Dutch vessel, Den
Onzekeren, captured by the French privateer Le Citoyen de Marseille in November 1794. The
libellant, John Geyer, was acting as an agent for the Dutch ship owners. He filed the action,
initially captioned Geyer v. Den Onzekeren, in the U.S. district court in South Carolina in
February 1795. The district court ruled in favor of the Dutch owners in April 1795 on the
grounds that the French privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of
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and Talbot v. Jansen.169 The French privateers lost only two of these eight
cases: Talbot v. Jansen and Cotton v. Wallace.

U.S. neutrality. After hearing additional evidence, the circuit court reversed that decree in
November 1795, ruling in favor of the French captors. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit
Court decree in March 1796. Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8,
at 133–88. See also Moodie v. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742).
168. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796). This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Betty
Cathcart, captured by the French privateer Le Citoyen de Marseille in November 1794. The
libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action on
behalf of the British ship owners in the U.S. district court in South Carolina in January 1795. The
district court ruled in favor of the British owners in April 1795 on the grounds that the French
privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of U.S. neutrality. On
appeal to the circuit court, the case was consolidated with Geyer v. Michel because both cases
involved the same French privateer. See supra note 167. After hearing additional evidence, the
circuit court reversed the district court decree, ruling in favor of the French captors. The Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court decree in March 1796. Information about the case is derived
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 133–88.
169. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). This was an in rem action against a Dutch vessel, the Vrow
Christina Magdalena, captured in May 1794. Two privateers flying French flags were jointly
responsible for the capture: the L’Ami de la Liberte, commanded by Captain Edward Ballard, and
the L’Ami de la Point-a-Petre, commanded by Captain William Talbot. See Jansen v. The Vrow
Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 7216). When the captors brought the
Magdalena into Charleston, Joost Jansen, the Dutch master of the Magdalena, filed a libel on
behalf of the Dutch ship owners seeking restitution of the captured vessel and its cargo. Jansen
alleged that the two ships claiming to be French privateers were owned by U.S. citizens, and that
Ballard and Talbot were both U.S. citizens. See id. at 356–58. Talbot invoked the law of nations
and Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France as a bar to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The
district court ruled in favor of the Dutch owners in August 1794. The circuit court affirmed that
decree in November 1794, and the Supreme Court affirmed in August 1795.
Four Supreme Court Justices wrote separate opinions in Talbot: Justice Iredell’s opinion
provides the clearest statement of the Court’s rationale for rejecting Talbot’s objection to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In his view, although Article 17 precludes U.S. courts from making
“examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes,” 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29,
art. XVII, the courts must still examine the facts to ascertain whether a case fits within the scope
of the exemption granted by the Treaty. Talbot, 3 U.S. at 159. Moreover, the treaty term
“privateers” refers only to lawfully commissioned privateers. Id. Therefore, the district courts
must first decide whether a privateer is lawfully commissioned before concluding that Article 17
precludes them from exercising jurisdiction. See id. Information about the case is derived from 6
DHSC, supra note 10, at 650–718.
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The ten unpublished decisions are: Moodie v. The Brig Favorite,170
Wallace v. The Brig Caesar,171 Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid,172 Moodie v. The
Ship Phyn,173 Moodie v. The Ship Britannia,174 Moodie v. The Brig Eliza
170. Moodie v. The Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Feb. 29, 1796), reprinted in
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Favorite,
captured by the French privateer La Parisienne in March 1795. The libellant, Benjamin Moodie,
was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in South
Carolina in March 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor of
the French captors in April 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in November
1795, and by the Supreme Court in February 1796. Information about the case is derived from
BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS, supra note 17, at 39; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 136–37; and from
the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
171. Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Feb. 29, 1796), reprinted in
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Caesar,
captured by the French privateer La Parisienne in December 1794. The libellant, John Wallace,
was the British consul in Georgia. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in Georgia in
January 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor of the French
captors in February 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in May 1795, and by the
Supreme Court in February 1796. Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra
note 8 , at 53–75.
172. Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 1, 1796), reprinted in 1
DHSC, supra note 9, at 265–66. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Mermaid,
captured by the French privateer General Laveaux in January 1795. The libellant, Benjamin
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in
South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in
favor of the French captors in April 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in March 1796. Information about the case is derived
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 76–118; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 140–41; and from the
author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. See also British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F.
Cas. 169 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897).
173. Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 14, 1796), reprinted in
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 272. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Phyn,
captured by the French privateer General Laveaux in January 1795. The libellant, Benjamin
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in
South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in
favor of the French captors in April 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in March 1796. Information about the case is derived
from JACKSON, supra note 26, at 142–43, and from the author’s research in the Supreme Court
archives.
174. Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), reprinted in 1
DHSC, supra note 9, at 278. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Britannia,
captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in June 1795. The libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was
the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in South
Carolina in July 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor of the
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(Eliza I),175 Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly,176 Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza
II),177 Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack,178 and Pintado v. The Ship San
Joseph.179 In all ten cases, the French privateers scored consistent victories in
the district court, the circuit court, and the Supreme Court.

French captors in September 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in November
1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about the case is derived from the
author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
175. Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796),
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Eliza, captured by the French privateers General Laveaux and La Mere Michel in January 1795.
The libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in
the U.S. district court in South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.
The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in April 1795. That decree was affirmed by
the circuit court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information
about the case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
176. Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), reprinted in 1
DHSC, supra note 9, at 278. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Tivoly,
captured by the French privateers General Laveaux and La Mere Michel in January 1795. The
libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the
U.S. district court in South Carolina in April 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The
district court ruled in favor of the French captors in April 1795. That decree was affirmed by the
circuit court in October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about the
case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
177. Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796),
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Eliza, captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in September 1795. The libellant, Benjamin
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in
South Carolina in September or October 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district
court ruled in favor of the French captors in October 1795. That decree was affirmed by the
circuit court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about
the case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
178. Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796),
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278. This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the
Potowmack, captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in June 1795. The libellant, Benjamin
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in
South Carolina in July 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor
of the French captors in September 1795. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in
November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796. Information about the case is
derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.
179. Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 10, 1796),
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 280. This was an in rem action against a Spanish vessel,
the San Joseph, captured by the French privateer La Vengeance in May 1795. The libellant, Don
Diego Pintado, was the ship owner. He filed the action in the U.S. district court in New York in
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Overall, the French privateers prevailed in sixteen of the eighteen cases
where ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits seeking restitution of
enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers.180 In fourteen of those
cases, the courts at all three levels—district courts, circuit courts, and Supreme
Court—ruled in favor of the French privateers.181 This point is significant
because it lends credence to the French allegation that these were frivolous
lawsuits filed for the purpose of harassing the privateers and thwarting the
accomplishment of their military objectives. British consuls were the named
plaintiffs in thirteen of the eighteen cases,182 and a Spanish vice-consul was the
named plaintiff in one other case.183 As a formal matter, the consuls were
merely representing the private interests of merchant ship owners. However,
as a practical matter, the active participation of the British consuls also lends
credence to the French allegation that the British government was pursuing a
conscious “lawfare” strategy to disrupt the military activities of French
privateers.
It is also noteworthy that fourteen of the eighteen cases involved British
merchant vessels, and the French privateers won thirteen of those fourteen
cases.184 Assuming that the British strategy was to deny the privateers any
financial gain from their lawful prizes while the litigation was pending, that
strategy was quite effective. The courts retained control of the captured
property, or the money obtained from the sale of that property, until there was
a final disposition of the cases by the Supreme Court.185 In descending order,
the time lag between the initial libel and final disposition by the Supreme
Court in the thirteen British cases where the privateers prevailed was as
follows: Perseverance (29 months), Eliza I (18 months), Tivoly (16 months),
Alfred (16 months), Phoebe Anne (15 months), Betty Cathcart (14 months),

July 1795. The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in December 1795. That decree
was affirmed by the circuit court in April 1796, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.
Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 524–54. See also United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). The private action initiated by Don Diego
Pintado and the government enforcement action against La Vengeance were litigated in tandem.
180. See supra notes 162–79.
181. In both Geyer v. Michel and Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, the district court ruled
against the French privateers, but the circuit court reversed that ruling, and the Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment in favor of the privateers. See supra notes 167–68; see also Geyer v.
Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796).
182. These thirteen cases include the eleven “Moodie” cases cited in the preceding
paragraphs, as well as Wallace v. Brig Caesar and Cotton v. Wallace.
183. See supra note 165; see also Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
184. The British won Cotton v. Wallace. See supra note 166.
185. In suits initiated by private parties, the courts seized captured prizes, but they never
asserted control over the French privateering vessels. However, in enforcement actions initiated
by the government, the courts would seize French privateering vessels. See, e.g., United States v.
La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
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Britannia (13 months), Potowmack (13 months), Phyn (13 months), Mermaid
(13 months), Caesar (13 months), Eliza II (11 months), and Favorite (11
months).186
Finally, the attentive reader may have noted that thirteen of the eighteen
cases were filed in the U.S. district court in South Carolina.187 In the 1790s,
the exclusive venue for an in rem admiralty action was the place where the
ship was located. French privateers routinely brought their prizes to
Charleston, South Carolina, in part because Charleston “in the 1790s was a
bastion of Francophilia.”188 Once a privateer brought his prize to Charleston, a
ship owner who wanted to file an in rem action to obtain restitution of the
captured prize had no choice but to file his claim in the South Carolina district
court. In those days, there was a single judge assigned to each federal district
court. Thomas Bee was the federal district judge for the district of South
Carolina. As discussed more fully in the next section, Judge Bee’s decisions
were very influential in shaping the law related to French privateers because he
decided most of the French privateering cases at the district court level,189 and
the Supreme Court affirmed most of those decisions without any written
opinion.
C. Two Case Studies
Recall that the Supreme Court held in Sloop Betsey that federal district
courts have jurisdiction over claims for restitution by ship owners who allege
that a privateer captured a neutral ship.190 Additionally, Congress enacted
legislation granting district courts jurisdiction over claims for restitution in
cases where privateers captured enemy ships in U.S. territorial waters.191
However, the eighteen cases where ship owners or their agents filed in rem
suits seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels did not fit within either of
these jurisdictional principles because all eighteen cases involved captures of
enemy ships on the high seas. In these eighteen cases, the libellants generally
raised two types of allegations. First, they alleged that the privateers had been
illegally outfitted in U.S. ports or had augmented their forces in U.S. ports.
Second, they alleged that the privateers were owned by Americans,

186. For the dates of the libels and the Supreme Court decisions see supra notes 162–78.
187. See supra notes 163–78.
188. 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 651; see also JACKSON, supra note 26, at 3–6, 21–25.
189. Judge Bee’s decisions in admiralty cases are published in BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS,
supra note 17. Many of these cases were also published later in the “Federal Cases” collection,
first published in 1894. That collection was intended to be “a comprehensive compilation of the
decisions of the United States Circuit and District Courts” from 1789 to 1880. Preface to 1 THE
FEDERAL CASES COMPRISING CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at iii (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894).
190. See supra Part II.C.3.
191. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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commanded by U.S. citizens, or manned by U.S. citizens. The legislation
enacted by Congress in June 1794 created criminal penalties for individuals
who accepted a commission from a foreign state,192 enlisted to serve on a
foreign privateer,193 outfitted a foreign privateer in a U.S. port,194 or augmented
the force of a privateer in a U.S. port.195 However, Congress did not explicitly
authorize private claims for restitution to enforce these laws, nor did Congress
explicitly authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over these types of
claims.196
When libellants filed claims seeking restitution of vessels captured by
French privateers, the French captors routinely invoked Article 17 of the 1778
Treaty with France as a bar to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In Sloop Betsey,
the libellants persuaded the Supreme Court to sidestep Article 17 by noting
that the Article, by its terms, applies only to “ships and goods taken from their
enemies.”197 Therefore, they argued, the courts must undertake a factual
inquiry to determine whether the vessel is an enemy vessel before they can
conclude that Article 17 bars jurisdiction. In the eighteen cases referenced
above, the federal district courts effectively extended this logic to all
allegations of unlawful captures. Although the district courts eventually
dismissed most of the cases on the grounds that Article 17 barred jurisdiction,
they first undertook a factual inquiry to determine whether the capture was
lawful.
France thought this approach violated Article 17 for two reasons. First, the
district courts exercised in rem jurisdiction over French prizes while the claims
were being adjudicated, thereby preventing French privateers from exercising
their right under Article 17 “to carry whithersoever they please the ships and
goods taken from their enemies.”198 Second, even though Article 17 prohibited
U.S. courts from making “examination concerning the lawfulness of such
prizes,”199 the district courts examined the merits of factual allegations
supporting claims of unlawful captures before they dismissed the claims for
lack of jurisdiction. This section presents two case studies to illustrate, first,
192. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, §1, 1 Stat. 381, 381–82.
193. Id. § 2.
194. Id. § 3.
195. Id. § 4.
196. Claims alleging illegal recruitment of U.S. citizens and illegal outfitting in U.S. ports fell
within the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Section 9 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. See Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. When Congress enacted new legislation in 1794,
it expressly authorized jurisdiction over claims involving captures in U.S. territorial waters, Act
of June 5, 1794, § 6, but said nothing about jurisdiction over claims alleging illegal recruitment or
outfitting. Thus, French litigants made an “expresio unius” argument that the 1794 legislation
precluded jurisdiction over these types of claims.
197. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
198. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII.
199. Id.
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judicial decision making in the privateering cases, and second, U.S.-French
diplomacy related to those cases.
1.

The Mermaid: A Case Study of Judicial Decision Making

On January 12, 1795, the French privateer General Laveaux captured a
British merchant vessel, The Mermaid, and brought her to Charleston, South
Carolina.200 The British Consul in South Carolina, Benjamin Moodie, filed a
libel seeking restitution of The Mermaid to its British owners.201 The libel
alleged three grounds for restitution: (1) that the General Laveaux was owned
by U.S. citizens; (2) that the General Laveaux had been illegally outfitted in
Charleston; and (3) that “the greatest part of the crew . . . consisted of citizens
of the United States.”202
John Gaillard, the captain of General Laveaux, and Nicholas Gautier, the
prize master of The Mermaid, filed an answer to Moodie’s libel.203 In their
answer, they contested the factual allegations of the libel and pled Article 17 of
the Treaty with France in bar to the libel.204 By invoking Article 17 as a “plea
in bar” to the libel, the French were making a procedural move analogous to
what would now be called a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Judge
Thomas Bee ruled “that the plea in bar of the Seventeenth Article of the Treaty
with France filed in this cause is relevant and that the libel be dismissed with
costs.”205 In other words, Judge Bee dismissed the libel on the grounds that
Article 17 barred the exercise of jurisdiction.
However, Judge Bee reached this conclusion only after he addressed the
merits of each of the three claims raised in the libel. After hearing evidence on
those claims, Judge Bee concluded that the General Laveaux was not an
American vessel, that she was not illegally outfitted in the United States, and
that there was no evidence to support the charge that her crew consisted mostly
of American citizens.206 In short, Judge Bee first addressed the merits of the
claims raised in the libel and then dismissed the libel for lack of jurisdiction
after concluding that those claims were without merit.

200. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–45.
201. See id. at 45.
202. British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. 169, 170 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897).
203. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–45.
204. See id. at 45.
205. British Consul v. The Mermaid, decree of federal district court (Apr. 3, 1795), as
reprinted in Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files
(National Archives Microfilm Publications). For reasons unknown to the author, the language
quoted in the text is not reproduced in the district court opinion published in Federal Cases.
However, Judge Bee used virtually identical language in dismissing all of the cases that the
author reviewed in the Supreme Court archives.
206. See The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. at 170–71.
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The district court decided The Mermaid fairly expeditiously. Moodie filed
his libel on February 26, 1795, and Judge Bee issued his decree on April 3,
1795.207 However, the circuit court did not affirm Moodie’s decree until
November 1795,208 and the Supreme Court did not issue its final decision until
March 1796.209 Since it was an in rem proceeding, the district court retained
custody over the prize while the case was pending in the circuit court and the
Supreme Court. France viewed this lengthy detention of the prize as a
violation of Article 17, because judicial custody prevented the privateers from
carrying their prize “whithersoever they please.”210 Moreover, from France’s
perspective, insofar as the appellate courts affirmed a lower court ruling that
addressed the merits of the claim that The Mermaid was captured illegally, the
courts violated Article 17 by making “examination concerning the lawfulness
of such prizes.”211
The Supreme Court never published an opinion in The Mermaid.
However, Justice Iredell produced a draft opinion that provides some support
for French allegations that the courts were violating Article 17.212 To
understand Justice Iredell’s analysis, it is necessary to elaborate on the
underlying facts.213 The General Laveaux was originally an American vessel,
the Cygnet. The ship was docked in Charleston, South Carolina, for some time
during the year 1794. While in Charleston, work was done on the ship.
According to the British libellants, this work constituted illegal outfitting.
According to the French claimants, the ship underwent repairs, which were
entirely legal.214 The ship sailed to Saint-Domingue, a French territory in the
Caribbean, where it was purchased by Mathew Moreau, a French citizen. (The
British libellants alleged that the sale to Moreau was fraudulent; hence, the
ship was still American.) By the end of the year, the Cygnet had been renamed
the General Laveaux. The General Laveaux sailed as a privateer from SaintDomingue in late 1794 with a French commission. It captured The Mermaid in
January 1795.

207. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 45.
208. See id. at 47–48.
209. See Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 1, 1796), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265–
66.
210. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII.
211. Id.
212. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC,
supra note 8, at 112–15.
213. This summary of the facts is drawn from three sources: British Consul v. The Mermaid,
4 F. Cas. 169 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897); 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–46; and JACKSON, supra
note 26, at 69–72. Although the three sources differ in certain details, the account presented here
is generally consistent with all three.
214. Article 19 of the 1778 Treaty with France expressly grants French ships a right to carry
out repairs in U.S. ports. See 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XIX.
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Justice Iredell’s analysis is divided into three parts.215 First, he considered
the allegation that the privateer had been “fitted out & equipped in
America.”216 Justice Iredell wrote:
Admitting the fact, this only a local offence against the Neutral Nation . . .
[d]oes not in itself divest the property. . . . If therefore truly & bona fide
alienated, she became French property, & as such the owners under a real
French Commission had a right to cruize, & bringing her prizes into American
217
Ports entitled to the protection of the 17 Art.

The implication of this statement is clear. If a British libellant seeks restitution
of a captured prize on the grounds that the French privateer was illegally
outfitted in U.S. ports, the court should dismiss the claim without addressing
the merits, because illegal outfitting, even if proven, would not invalidate the
legality of a subsequent capture made by a French privateer with a valid
commission. Moreover, Article 17 precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into
the lawfulness of the capture. If this analysis is correct, Judge Bee violated
Article 17 by examining the merits of the illegal outfitting claim, even though
he eventually relied on Article 17 as a basis for dismissing the libel.218
Second, Justice Iredell considered the argument that the June 1794
legislation provided for forfeiture of a vessel that was illegally outfitted in U.S.
ports.219 Consistent with the preceding analysis, he wrote: “Admitting a
Forfeiture had incurred by a special Law of the U.S., this would not invalidate
a prize taken by her after a bona fide alienation to a real French Citizen in
another Country.”220 Iredell agreed that the United States could institute a
forfeiture action against the privateer, but forfeiture of the privateer “does not
necessarily infer a forfeiture of all the Prizes which such Vessel might take.”221
Moreover, “a fair capture under a real French Commission by real French
Citizens would be exempt from any enquiry of . . . ours,”222 because such
enquiry is prohibited by Article 17 and the law of nations. In short, the U.S.
statute authorizing forfeiture of privateers that were illegally outfitted in U.S.
215. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC,
supra note 8, at 112–15.
216. Id. at 112.
217. Id. The quotes are taken from Justice Iredell’s notes, which did not contain complete
sentences. The author has chosen to use the actual text of the original, rather than trying to
correct the grammar.
218. The same logic would apply to the allegation in the libel that most of the crew of the
General Laveaux were Americans. Dismissal of this claim was not appealed because the
libellants failed to adduce any evidence in support of this claim in the district court.
219. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC,
supra note 8, at 112–14; see also Act of June 5, 1794, ch.50, § 3, 1 Stat. 381, 383.
220. James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra
note 8, at 112 (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at 114.
222. Id.
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ports did not authorize U.S. courts to adjudicate the merits of claims for
restitution of vessels captured by those privateers.
Third, Justice Iredell addressed the allegation that the General Laveaux
was actually American property, not French property. “If this appeared clearly
to [the] Court,” he wrote, then the captured prize “ought to be restored.”223
Although Justice Iredell did not fully articulate his rationale, he was probably
drawing a distinction between actions that violated U.S. law, such as illegal
outfitting, and actions that violated the law of nations. If an American-owned
vessel purported to act as a French privateer, any capture made by that vessel
would be invalid under the law of nations,224 and the illegality of the capture
would require restitution of the captured prize. Justice Iredell emphasized the
“[i]mportance of the 17 Article,” and warned that restitution based on alleged
American ownership of the privateer should not be awarded “upon light or
doubtful grounds.”225 If U.S. courts accepted allegations of American
ownership too easily, then Article 17 would be “of no value,” and the owners
of captured prizes would raise “a Claim in every case.”226
By the time Justice Iredell wrote his draft opinion, in March 1796, the
French privateers had already abandoned American ports in favor of French
ports in the Caribbean.227 Thus, even if Iredell’s opinion had been published, it
would not have had any effect on the decisions of lower courts, because those
courts were adjudicating the French privateer cases in 1794 and 1795, when
the privateers were still bringing their prizes into U.S. ports. As illustrated by
Judge Bee’s decision in The Mermaid, the lower courts generally addressed the
merits of illegal outfitting claims before they dismissed the claims for lack of
jurisdiction (contrary to Justice Iredell’s preferred approach). By manifesting
their willingness to adjudicate the merits of those claims, the courts, perhaps
unwittingly, encouraged British, Spanish and Dutch libellants to file “a claim
in every case,” as Justice Iredell warned.
2.

The Sans Pareil: A Case Study of U.S.-French Diplomacy

On July 27, 1794, the French privateer Sans Pareil captured the British
merchant vessel Perseverance.228 The privateer put on board a prize crew led
by Jean Bernard. Bernard sailed Perseverance to Newport, Rhode Island,
223. Id. (alteration in original).
224. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795) (affirming decree by Judge Thomas
Bee, which ordered restitution of a Dutch vessel captured by individuals claiming to be French
privateers, in part because one of the self-styled privateers was a U.S. citizen who had never
received a valid commission from the French government).
225. James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra
note 8, at 114.
226. Id.
227. See infra Part III.D.
228. The summary of facts in this paragraph is taken from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 811–13.
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arriving there on August 13. The next day, Thomas Moore, the British viceconsul in Rhode Island, wrote to the Governor alleging that the Perseverance
had been captured illegally and seeking restoration of the captured vessel to its
British owner. The Governor, Arthur Fenner, seized the vessel pending
resolution of the dispute. Joseph Fauchet, the French Ambassador in
Philadelphia, soon learned about the case.
On August 26, 1794, Fauchet wrote to Secretary of State Randolph to
protest. Fauchet’s letter began by noting that he had received “a great number
of complaints” regarding the “vexations which our privateers are made to
experience at the instigation of English agents.”229 Fauchet clearly believed
that France’s enemies were initiating frivolous legal proceedings to harass
French privateers. His letter referred to “those unjust and odious proceedings,”
and to “those miserable chicaneries, shamefully employed to damp the courage
of the mariners.”230 Then, he specifically addressed the Sans Pareil:
I pray you to cause orders to be given to the officers of the customs at
Newport, to restore to the agent of the republic, the prize made by the privateer
Sans Pareil. . . . [T]his prize has been seized, and under the pretext that the
privateer Sans Pareil had been armed in the ports of the United States. If this
pretext had been really alleged, a more glaring injustice and more palpable
falsehood could not have been disguised . . . but, perhaps, as has frequently
happened, they have only wished to discourage and fatigue the captors, by
injuring the prize, from the length of time required for obtaining the decision,
which they will retard by a thousand unfair expedients. In this case, sir, it is at
length time to take a determination which will secure the interests of the
captors, who, without this precaution, will be always injured, whatever may be
the determination of the courts; they will be affected, first by the loss of time;
secondly, by the expenses in prosecuting this business; and, lastly, by waste in
231
the merchandises and vessels which they shall have taken.

Thus, from France’s perspective, even when French privateers ultimately
prevailed in legal proceedings, they were still the losers, because the legal
proceedings cost them valuable time and money. Moreover, the loss of time
and money adversely affected France’s strategic interests by providing
economic disincentives to privateering, thereby making it harder to recruit
additional privateers.232

229. Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 26, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 588.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. It bears emphasis that the economic disincentive to privateering was not an ordinary
incident of naval warfare during this era. In the “typical” naval conflict, a privateer could obtain
a speedy judgment by bringing a captured vessel to a prize court in his home country; this process
rarely led to protracted litigation. However, in the American theater of the war between France
and Great Britain, the British were able to exploit the geographic distance between the United
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On September 3, 1794, Secretary Randolph wrote to Fauchet to inform him
that he had “urged the Governor of Rhode Island to report, without delay, the
case of the prize taken by the privateer Sans Pareil.”233 Randolph added: “Be
assured, sir . . . that the Government of the United States will not suffer the
acquisitions of the French privateers to be wrested from them, without
adequate cause; nor yet, that they should be wantonly vexed by unjust
detentions.”234 Two days later, on September 5, Governor Fenner ruled in
favor of the French privateers and “ordered the Perseverance delivered to” the
French captors.235 On September 27, Randolph wrote to Fauchet to report the
good news.236 However, the communication from Governor Fenner to
Secretary Randolph to Ambassador Fauchet lagged far behind the pace of
actual events.
The French captors sold the Perseverance and its cargo on September 8,
1794.237 However, before they could escape with the funds, the British owner,
Thomas Jennings, “secured a monition requiring the United States marshal to
retain the funds” and filed a libel in the federal district court.238 In the libel,
Jennings alleged two violations of the June 1794 legislation enacted by
Congress. He claimed “that the Sans Pareil had been augmented in force” in
Charleston, South Carolina,239 in violation of Section 4 of the statute, and that
the Sans Pareil was “to an extent manned with Americans,”240 in violation of
Section 2. He also alleged that none of the Frenchmen on board the Sans
Pareil had a valid commission.241 For all of these reasons, he claimed that the
capture of the Perseverance was illegal, and he sought damages to compensate
him for the loss of the ship and its cargo.
States and the nearest French prize courts by subjecting French privateers to protracted litigation
when they brought their captured prizes to U.S. ports.
233. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 3, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 588; see also Letter from Edmund Randolph to Arthur Fenner (Sept. 3, 1794), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 589 (discussing the Sans Pareil and noting that the French Ambassador
is concerned that “the ardor of French privateers [may] be damped by the vexations which a
seizure of their prizes may produce”).
234. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 3, 1794) in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 588.
235. 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 812–13. In August 1793—after several district courts had
dismissed French privateering cases for lack of jurisdiction and before the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey—the Secretary of War had written to state governors to
encourage them to adjudicate these cases. See id. at 812. That is why the British sought relief
from Governor Fenner and why he agreed to perform a judicial function in this case.
236. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 27, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 588.
237. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 812–13.
238. Id. at 813.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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When Fauchet learned that the British owner had initiated judicial
proceedings, after the Governor of Rhode Island had already ruled in favor of
the French captors, he was furious. On October 17, 1794, Fauchet wrote to
Randolph as follows:
You announce to me that La Perseverance, prize to the Sans Pareil, had been
delivered to the captors by order of the Governor of Rhode Island; in contempt
of that decision the English agents have just created new difficulties . . . . It is
impossible, sir, for this state of things to continue much longer. You are
sensible how necessary it will be to retrench from our treaty the article which
reciprocally permits the ships of war of the two nations to conduct to, and sell
their prizes in, their respective ports, should this right become illusory and void
by the difficulty thrown in the way of its execution. I proposed a method as
simple as it is just, for putting an end to this tyrannical chicanery: this method
was, to require security from those who prosecuted prizes as illegal. Were this
measure adopted, it would render our enemies less ingenious in their
proceedings, and prevent them from bringing so many actions . . . .
. . . I expect, sir, that the Federal Government will put an end to these
persecutions by the mode I have proposed, or by any other which its wisdom
242
may suggest.

Randolph was evidently sympathetic to Fauchet’s plea.243 Nevertheless, he
told Fauchet pointedly that the Executive Branch could not intervene in
ongoing judicial proceedings and that the judiciary was the proper branch of
government to resolve disputes between French privateers and British ship
owners:
If, however, individuals conceive that they have a legal claim upon her, and
draw her before a court of law, the Executive of the United States cannot
forbid them. The plea, under [Article 17 of] the treaty, that the court has no
cognizance of French prizes, will be admitted if it applies, and the person by
whom the process is instituted will be liable to a judgment for costs and
damages, if he fails in his proof.
The bond, which you propose as a security against vexation, we have no
power to demand, because the Executive do not mean to interfere, without
presumptive proof of title; and this presumption, when established, would
seem to be a sufficient protection against being harassed. The courts have their
244
forms . . . . I am not authorized to make the arrangement proposed.

242. Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 17, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra
note 18, at 589.
243. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Oct. 22, 1794), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 589 (expressing his wish “that we were always able to administer immediate
relief”).
244. Id.
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Thus, Randolph tacitly acknowledged that Article 17 barred the exercise of
jurisdiction by U.S. courts in certain cases. However, the courts had to
exercise jurisdiction for the limited purpose of deciding whether Article 17
applied. Moreover, in Randolph’s view, if Fauchet wanted to offer suggestions
about procedural innovations to minimize vexatious lawsuits, he should direct
those suggestions to the judiciary, because there was no basis for the Executive
to intervene in the affairs of an independent branch of government.
Despite Ambassador Fauchet’s best efforts to assist the privateers who had
a legitimate claim to the funds from the sale of The Perseverance, the judicial
process consumed almost two-and-a-half years. The French captors could not
obtain access to the funds until February 1797, when the Supreme Court issued
its final decision in Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance.245
D. The End of French Privateering in the United States
“By early November 1795,” French privateering activities in U.S. ports
“had all but ceased.”246 There were three key factors that contributed to the
decline of French privateering in the United States: the Jay Treaty,247 lawfare
in U.S. courts, and geo-political developments in the Caribbean.
In the spring of 1794, “the British had a stranglehold on French
possessions in the Caribbean.”248 Since the British denied French privateers
access to French ports in the Caribbean, and the privateers did not want to
carry their prizes across the Atlantic to sell them in France, the best economic
choice was to sell their prizes in U.S. ports. However, the strategic situation in
the Caribbean changed dramatically between June 1794 and late 1795. France
launched a successful attack against the British in Guadeloupe in June 1794.249
Having reestablished a foothold in the Caribbean, France bided its time over
the next several months. Then, between March and June of 1795, France
launched a major offensive that led to a string of French victories in the
Caribbean.250 In July 1795, the Treaty of Basel terminated hostilities between
France and Spain.251 By the end of 1795, France and Spain had become allies
in a war against Great Britain.252 As a result of these developments, French
privateers were able to take their prizes to French prize courts in the

245. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797).
246. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 104.
247. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116
[hereinafter Jay Treaty].
248. 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 651.
249. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 63–64.
250. See id. at 88–90.
251. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 752.
252. See JACKSON, supra note 26, at 104–05.
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Caribbean. These “new privateering opportunities” in the Caribbean operated
as a “magnet that drew the French privateers away from” the United States.253
The economic magnet of privateering opportunities in the Caribbean
combined with the financial drain imposed by British lawfare in U.S. courts to
lure French privateers away from U.S. ports toward French ports in the
Caribbean. The privateers did not need to be financial wizards to calculate the
costs and benefits of the two options. Since the French could not operate prize
courts in the United States, prizes sold in the United States without prior
condemnation by a prize court invariably sold at a reduced price.254 Moreover,
if a commander brought his captured prize to a U.S. port, he could expect the
gains from his business venture to be tied up in U.S. courts for twelve to
eighteen months.255 Unless he had a cushion of cash reserves on hand, he
would be unable to pay his crew, making it difficult, if not impossible, to hire
crew for the next voyage. In contrast, if he took his prize to a French port in
the Caribbean, he could obtain a judgment from a French prize court, sell the
prize quickly at full value, and use the profits to finance additional privateering
ventures.
The United States and Great Britain signed the Jay Treaty in November
1794, and the Treaty entered into force in October 1795.256 By October 1795,
many of the French privateers had already abandoned U.S. ports in favor of
Caribbean ports. For those who continued bringing prizes to U.S. ports,
however, the Jay Treaty was the final nail in the coffin. Article 24 expressly
prohibited privateers commissioned by France from selling their prizes in U.S.
ports as long as France was at war with Great Britain.257 The French
Ambassador protested vehemently that “the stipulations of the treaty concluded
with England . . . destroy the effect of [France’s] treaty with the United
States.”258 Article 25 of the Jay Treaty preserved French rights under the 1778
Treaty between the United States and France.259 However, Secretary of State
Pickering maintained that Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty never actually gave
253. Id. at 87–88, 103–06.
254. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
256. Jay Treaty, supra note 247.
257. Id. art. XXIV.
258. Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Edmund Randolph (June 30, 1795), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 594.
259. Jay Treaty, supra note 247, art. XXV (“Nothing in this treaty contained shall, however,
be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public treaties with other sovereigns or
states. But the two parties agree, that while they continue in amity, neither of them will in future
make any treaty that shall be inconsistent with this or the preceding article.”). Secretary of State
Randolph explained to Ambassador Adet that, under Article 25, “You shall continue to enjoy
your rights under the seventeenth article of our treaty with France. . . . The prohibition, on which
you lay so much stress, is not against past but future treaties.” Letter from Edmund Randolph to
Pierre Auguste Adet (July 6, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 595, 596.
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French privateers a right to sell their prizes in U.S. ports: the United States had
simply permitted French privateers to sell their prizes in U.S. ports as a matter
of policy.260 Thus, although Article 25 of the Jay Treaty preserved France’s
preexisting legal rights under Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty, Article 24 of the
Jay Treaty provided the controlling rule because it expressly prohibited sales of
French prizes in U.S. ports, and this prohibition was not contrary to any legal
right granted under the 1778 Treaty.261
In sum, the British lawfare strategy was undoubtedly a success in the sense
that it was one of three key factors that helped induce French privateers to
abandon the use of U.S. ports as a base of operations. However, the broader
military consequences of the strategy are difficult to assess. It is likely that
Great Britain gained some strategic advantage because British merchant
vessels had easier access to U.S. ports after the French privateers moved south
to the Caribbean. On the other hand, the advantage to France of greater access
to French ports in the Caribbean may have offset the disadvantages for France
associated with the exodus of French privateers from U.S. ports.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis of the French privateering cases demonstrates that
the exclusive political control thesis is inconsistent with the Founders’
understanding of the constitutional separation of powers in foreign affairs.
This concluding section briefly highlights two important historical points and
discusses the contemporary relevance of the privateering cases.
The first key historical point relates to Great Britain’s use of lawfare
tactics. As noted above, the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in 2003 that
lawfare was a “new phenomenon.”262 Part III showed that lawfare is not a new
phenomenon; Great Britain used lawfare tactics successfully in the 1790s to
help induce French privateers to stop bringing their prizes into U.S. ports.
Second, although the privateering cases raised significant national security
and foreign policy issues that were intimately connected to U.S. neutrality
policy, the Washington Administration chose to defer to the Judicial Branch
and allow judicial decision making in the privateering cases to guide the
implementation of U.S. neutrality policy. Four factors help explain the
government’s decision to handle these cases by means of private adjudication
in the courts, rather than diplomatic negotiation conducted by the Executive
Branch. First, many of the cases required someone to scrutinize large amounts
of conflicting evidence, and the Executive Branch did not have the personnel

260. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Pierre Auguste Adet (July 19, 1796), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 18, at 653–54.
261. See id.
262. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 139.
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to handle that task.263 Second, the main goal of U.S. policy was to preserve
U.S. neutrality; since the British and French were adversaries in most of the
cases, it helped promote an appearance of neutrality to let the judiciary serve as
a neutral decision maker, rather than having the Executive Branch resolve legal
disputes between the British and the French. Third, given the natural law
viewpoint that was prevalent among the Founders, many of the Founders
probably believed that the ship owners had a natural right to present their
claims in court to defend their property rights. Finally, resolution of the
privateering cases required a decision maker to apply general legal rules in
specific factual situations that involved disputes over the property rights of
private parties. Some members of the founding generation probably believed
that the Constitution granted the Judicial Branch primary (but not exclusive)
responsibility for deciding cases involving the rights of private parties that
required the application of law to fact.
The French privateering cases are similar to modern war on terror cases in
one key respect—in both sets of cases, questions of private rights are
inextricably linked to questions of international law and U.S. foreign policy.
Of course, there are also key differences between the two sets of cases. The
United States was a party in only two of the twenty-four privateering cases that
are the focus of this study.264 In contrast, the U.S. government is a party to
most of the modern war on terror cases.265 Moreover, both the Legislative and
Executive Branches encouraged active judicial involvement in the privateering
cases in the 1790s. In contrast, the Legislative and Executive Branches have
worked together in the past few years to minimize judicial involvement in
cases arising from the war on terror.266
Despite these differences, the privateering cases do offer an important
pragmatic lesson that is still relevant today. According to the New York
Times, “people in Britain and France told pollsters last spring that they had
263. During the period under study, there was no “Department of Justice,” and the Attorney
General did not have any staff to support him. The Secretary of State had a total domestic staff
(not counting overseas Ambassadors and consuls) of about six to eight clerks. See List of Civil
Officers of the United States, Except Judges, with Their Emoluments, for the Year Ending Oct. 1,
1792 (Feb. 27, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 57–59 (Walter Lowrie &
Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834), available at http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html; see also Roll of the Officers, Civil, Military, and Naval, of the
United States (Feb. 17, 1802), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra, at 260,
302, 304.
264. United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); United States v. Peters, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
265. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
266. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (note)); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (note)).
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even less confidence in [President Bush] to do the right thing in world affairs
than they had in President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.”267 U.S. foreign policy
cannot succeed if our key allies do not trust us to comply with our international
legal obligations. The Founders understood this: they wanted to convey a
message to the world that the United States was committed to the rule of law in
international affairs. In the 1790s, the Executive Branch reinforced this
message by deferring to the judiciary and allowing federal courts to decide key
issues related to French privateering activities. In the current geopolitical
situation, if the government wants to persuade U.S. allies that the United States
is committed to complying with its international legal obligations, it can
promote that objective by inviting judicial scrutiny of U.S. policies in the war
on terror, at least in cases where those policies are intimately bound up with
questions of international law and individual rights. In contrast, continued
resistance to judicial oversight reinforces the belief, which is widely shared
among the citizens of some of our closest allies, that the United States views
international law with a mixture of contempt and indifference.
Political realists might explain the differences between the 1790s and
today as a function of political power. Weak states are receptive to
international law because it has the potential to constrain their stronger
adversaries. Strong states are less receptive because international law tends to
equalize power imbalances among states, thereby reducing the comparative
advantage of stronger states. The United States embraced international law in
the 1790s because it was a weak state; the United States is suspicious of
international law today because it is a strong state. This explanation is fairly
persuasive, as far as it goes. But it does not answer the key normative
question: Is it generally in the national interest of the United States to comply
with its international legal obligations, and to be perceived as complying with
those obligations? There is ample room for disagreement on this question, but
a President who wants to persuade the world that the United States takes its
international legal obligations seriously could advance that goal by
encouraging a more active role for the federal judiciary in the implementation
of U.S. foreign policy.

267. Michael Cooper, McCain Offers Soothing Tones in Trip Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2008, at A1.

